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1Abstract
This chapter studies optimal monetary stabilization policy in interdepen-
dent open economies, by proposing a uni￿ed analytical framework system-
atizing the existing literature. In the model, the combination of complete
exchange-rate pass-through (￿ producer currency pricing￿ ) and frictionless as-
set markets ensuring e¢ cient risk sharing, results in a form of open-economy
￿ divine coincidence￿ : in line with the prescriptions in the baseline New-
Keynesian setting, the optimal monetary policy under cooperation is char-
acterized by exclusively inward-looking targeting rules in domestic output
gaps and GDP-de￿ ator in￿ ation. The chapter then examines deviations from
this benchmark, when cross-country strategic policy interactions, incomplete
exchange-rate pass-through (￿ local currency pricing￿ ) and asset market im-
perfections are accounted for. Namely, failure to internalize international
monetary spillovers results in attempts to manipulate international relative
prices to raise national welfare, causing ine¢ cient real exchange rate ￿ uc-
tuations. Local currency pricing and incomplete asset markets (preventing
e¢ cient risk sharing) shift the focus of monetary stabilization to redressing
domestic as well as external distortions: the targeting rules characterizing
the optimal policy are not only in domestic output gaps and in￿ ation, but
also in misalignments in the terms of trade and real exchange rates, and
cross-country demand imbalances.
Keywords: Currency misalignments, demand imbalances, pass-through,
asset markets and risk sharing, optimal targeting rules, international policy
cooperation
JEL codes: E44, E52, E61, F41, F42
21 Introduction and overview
Research in the international dimensions of optimal monetary policy has
long been inspired by a set of fascinating questions, shaping the policy de-
bate in at least two eras of progressive cross-border integration of goods,
factors, and assets markets ￿ in the years after World War I and from
Bretton Woods to today. Namely, should monetary policy respond to inter-
national variables such as exchange rates, global business cycle conditions,
or global imbalances beyond their in￿ uence on the domestic output gap and
in￿ ation? Do exchange rate movements have desirable stabilization and al-
locative properties? Or, on the contrary, should policymakers curb exchange
rate ￿ uctuations and be concerned with, and attempt to correct, currency
misalignments? Are there large gains the international community could
reap by strengthening cross-border monetary cooperation?
In this chapter, we revisit these classical questions by building on the
choice-theoretic monetary literature encompassing the research agenda of
the New Keynesian models (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford 1997), the
New Classical Synthesis (see, e.g., Goodfriend and King 1997), and espe-
cially the New Open Economy Macroeconomics, henceforth NOEM (see,
e.g., Svensson and van Wijnbergen 1989, Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 1995). In do-
ing so, we will naturally draw on a well-established set of general principles
in stabilization theory, which go beyond open-economy issues. Yet, the main
goal of our analysis is to shed light on monetary policy trade-o⁄s that are
inherently linked to open economies which engage in cross-border trade in
goods and assets.
A general feature sharply distinguishes monetary policy analysis in open
economies from its closed-economy counterpart. This consists of the need
to account explicitly for di⁄erent forms of heterogeneity that naturally arise
in an international context, ranging from instances of ex ante heterogene-
ity across countries such as product specialization, cross-country di⁄erences
in technology, preferences, currency denomination of prices, ￿nancial mar-
ket development, and asset holdings, to ex post heterogeneity such as the
asymmetric nature of shocks, as well as endogenous redistributions of wealth
across countries in response to shocks. While these forms of heterogeneity
enlarge the array of potential policy trade-o⁄s relevant to the analysis, in a
global equilibrium monetary policy problems are addressed using as many
policy instruments as there are monetary authorities in the model econ-
omy. Along this dimension as well, however, there could be heterogeneity in
objectives and policy strategies.
Building on an open-economy model which has been the workhorse for
3much of the literature ￿ featuring two countries, each specialized in the
production of a type of goods in di⁄erent varieties1 ￿ we study optimal
monetary policy under alternative assumptions regarding nominal rigidities
and asset market structure, adopting the linear-quadratic approach devel-
oped by Woodford (2003).
A ￿rst important result consists of deriving a general expression for the
open-economy New Keynesian Phillips curve, relating current in￿ ation to
expected in￿ ation and changes in marginal costs. In an open economy, the
latter (marginal costs) is a function of output gaps plus two additional terms,
one accounting for misalignments in international relative prices, the other
for ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations in aggregate demand across countries. In analogy
to the de￿nition of output gaps, we measure misalignments in terms of devi-
ations of international relative prices from their ￿rst-best levels.2 The term
accounting for ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations in aggregate demand instead measures
relative price- and preference-adjusted di⁄erentials in consumption demand,
which generally di⁄er from zero in the presence of ￿nancial market frictions.
This tripartite classi￿cation of factors driving the Phillips curve ￿ out-
put gaps, international relative price gaps, and cross-country demand imbal-
ances ￿ also provides the key building block for our policy analysis. Indeed,
a second important result is that, together with in￿ ation rates, the same
three factors listed above are the arguments in the quadratic loss functions
which can be derived for di⁄erent speci￿cations of our workhorse model. Of
course, the speci￿c way these arguments enter the loss functions vary across
model speci￿cations, re￿ ecting di⁄erent nominal and real distortions.
A well-known result from monetary theory is that stabilization policy
should maintain in￿ ation at low and stable rates, as a way to minimize
the misallocation of resources due to staggered nominal price adjustment.
In the baseline model with only one sector and one representative agent,
1The model, similarly to Chari et al. (2002), can be seen as a monetary counterpart to
the international real business cycle literature after Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994),
and, for versions including nontraded goods, Stockman and Tesar (1995). For recent
evidence on monetary models of exchange rates see Engel et al. (2007).
2We stress that, conceptually, the e¢ cient exchange rate is not necessarily (and in
general will not be) identical to the ￿ equilibrium exchange rate￿ , traditionally analyzed by
international and public institutions, as a guide to policy making. ￿ Equilibrium exchange
rates￿typically refer to some notion of long-term external balance, against which to as-
sess short-run movements in currency values (see e.g. Chinn 2010). On the contrary, the
e¢ cient exchange rate is theoretically and conceptually de￿ned at any time horizon, in
relation to a hypothetical economy in which all prices are ￿ exible and markets are com-
plete, in strict analogy to the notion of a welfare relevant output gap. In either case, the
assessment of e¢ cient prices and quantities, at both domestic and international levels,
posits a formidable challenge to researchers.
4such misallocation takes the form of price dispersion for goods which are
symmetric in preferences and technology. In such a model, optimal monetary
policy is characterized by a ￿ exible in￿ ation target, trading o⁄ ￿ uctuations
in the GDP de￿ ator and the output gap vis-￿-vis ine¢ cient shocks ￿ such as
markup shocks (which would not be accommodated by the social planner).
Conversely, the optimal target will result in the complete stabilization of the
domestic GDP de￿ ator and output gap, vis-￿-vis e¢ cient shocks ￿ such as
disturbances in productivity and tastes (which would be accommodated by
the social planner) ￿ see, e.g., Gal￿ (2008) or Woodford (2003).
As a ￿rst step in our study, we consider a speci￿cation of the workhorse
model for which the prescription guiding optimal monetary policy is identical
to the one for the benchmark economy mentioned above: optimal policy is
￿isomorphic￿to the one for baseline closed-economy models; see, e.g., Clar-
ida Gal￿ and Gertler (2002), henceforth CGG, and Benigno and Benigno
(2006), henceforth BB. For this to be the case, it is crucial that endogenous
movements in the exchange rate correct potential misalignments in the rela-
tive price between domestic and foreign goods in response to macroeconomic
shocks, in accord with the classical view of the international transmission
mechanism as formalized by, e.g., Friedman (1953).
Underlying the classical view, there are two key assumptions. First,
frictionless asset markets provide insurance against all possible contingen-
cies across borders. Second, producer prices are sticky in domestic cur-
rency, so that the foreign currency price of products move one-to-one with
the exchange rate ￿ the latter assumption is commonly dubbed producer
currency pricing (henceforth PCP) by the literature. By virtue of perfect
risk insurance and a high degree of exchange rate pass-through of import
prices, as stressed by Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Devereux and Engel
(2003), preventing price dispersion within categories of goods automatically
corrects any possible misalignment in the relative prices of domestic and for-
eign goods ￿ a form of ￿divine coincidence￿ , in the de￿nition of Blanchard
and Gal￿ (2007).
In relation to this baseline speci￿cation, the rest of our analysis calls at-
tention to open-economy distortions which break the divine coincidence just
de￿ned ￿ thus motivating optimal target rules explicitly featuring open-
economy variables. In a closed-economy context, the divine coincidence
breaks down in models including both price and wage rigidities, or price
rigidities in multiple sectors ￿ in which case the trade-o⁄ is between stabi-
lizing relative prices within and across categories of goods and services, see,
e.g., Erceg et al. (2000) ￿ or introducing agents￿heterogeneity, whereas
policy trade-o⁄s may then arise because of imperfect risk insurance, see,
5e.g., Curdia and Woodford (2009). Analogous trade-o⁄s naturally and most
plausibly arise in open economies in the form of misalignments in the terms
of trade (the relative price of imports in terms of exports) or the real ex-
change rate (the international relative price of consumption), as well as in
the form of cross-border imbalances in aggregate demand. At the core of
the policy problem raised by misalignments and imbalances however lies
the exchange rate in its dual role of relative price in the goods and the as-
set markets ￿ which has no counterpart in a closed-economic context. In
addition, ine¢ ciencies and trade-o⁄s with speci￿c international dimensions
result from cross-border monetary spillovers when these are not internalized
by national monetary authorities ￿ i.e., when these act noncooperatively in
setting their domestic monetary stance. Except under very special circum-
stances, all these considerations rule out isomorphism/similarities in policy
prescriptions in closed and open economies.
Under the maintained assumption of complete markets, in the ￿rst part
of the chapter we characterize optimal monetary policy in the presence of
distortions resulting either from nominal rigidities causing the same good to
be traded at di⁄erent prices across markets, or from national policymakers￿
failure to internalize international monetary spillovers. In the second part of
the chapter, we instead reconsider the optimal policy in an incomplete mar-
ket framework, focusing on the interactions between nominal and ￿nancial
distortions.3 We highlight below the main results of the chapter.
Skepticism of the classical view: local-currency price stability of
imports In contrast with the classical view, recent leading contributions
have emphasized the widespread evidence of local-currency stability in the
price of imports, attributing asigni￿cant portion of it to nominal rigidities.
In the data, exchange rate movements appear to be only weakly re￿ ected
in import prices (a large body of studies ranges from those surveyed by
Goldberg and Knetter 1997, to recent work based on individual goods data,
such as Gopinath and Rigobon 2008).
Under the assumption that import prices are sticky in the local currency
￿ a hypothesis commonly dubbed local currency pricing or LCP by the
literature ￿ the transmission of monetary policy is fundamentally di⁄erent
relative to the classical view. Namely, with LCP, exchange rate movements
have a limited impact on the price of imports faced by consumers ￿ pass-
3For a thorough analysis of the international dimensions of monetary policy, including
issues in macroeconomic stabilization in response to oil shocks and in monetary control
in a globalized world economy, see the excellent collection of contributions in Gal￿ and
Gertler (2009).
6through is incomplete. Rather, they cause widespread ine¢ cient deviations
from the law of one price: identical goods trade at di⁄erent prices (expressed
in the same currency) across national markets. Exchange rates cannot re-
align international and domestic relative prices at their e¢ cient level. In the
last few years, the debate contrasting the international transmission mech-
anism and policy analysis under PCP and LCP has arguably been the main
focus in the early NOEM literature (see, e.g., the discussion in Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄ 2000, Betts and Devereux 2000, and Engel 2002).
With LCP, there is no divine coincidence since cross-country output gap
stabilization no longer translates into relative price stabilization. In response
to productivity shocks, for instance, stabilizing marginal costs of domestic
producers neither coincides with stabilizing their markups in all markets, nor
it is su¢ cient to realign international prices. As shown by Engel (2009), the
optimal policy thus will have to trade o⁄internal objectives (output gaps and
an in￿ ation goal) with correcting misalignments. Speci￿cally, similar to the
PCP case, under LCP cooperative policymakers dislike national output gaps
and in￿ ation, as well as cross-country di⁄erences in output, to the extent
that these lead to misalignments in international relative prices. Yet, relative
to the PCP case, the in￿ ation rates relevant to policymakers are di⁄erent
for domestic goods than for imports. The di⁄erent terms in in￿ ation re￿ ect
the fact that, with LCP, policymakers are concerned with ine¢ ciencies in
the supply of each good due to price dispersion in the domestic and in the
export destination markets. In addition, the policy loss function includes a
new term in deviations from the law of one price, driving misalignments in
relative prices and causing ine¢ ciencies in the level and composition of global
consumption demand, a point especially stressed by the literature assuming
one-period preset prices; see Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005).
The targeting rules characterizing optimal policy under LCP are gen-
erally complex, involving a combination of current and expected values of
domestic variables, like the output gap and producer and consumer prices,
as well as of external variables, like the real exchange rate gap. Nonetheless,
they considerably simplify under two alternative conditions, that is, either
the disutility of labor is linear ￿ a case stressed by Engel (2009) ￿ or
purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the ￿rst best ￿ a case discussed
by the early contributions to the NOEM literature such as CGG and BB.
We show that either condition leads to the same clear-cut optimal policy
prescriptions: in the face of e¢ cient shocks policymakers should completely
stabilize CPI in￿ ation, the global output gap, and the real exchange rate
gap at the expense of terms of trade misalignments and understabilization
7of relative output gaps. This implies complete stabilization of consumption
around its e¢ cient level and, only when PPP holds, complete stabilization of
nominal exchange rates. The two special cases of PPP and linear disutility
of labor are noteworthy, in light of the attention they receive in the liter-
ature and their analytical tractability. Yet, the strong policy prescriptions
derived from their analysis should not be generalized.
Indeed, the main lesson from the LCP literature is that policymakers
should pay attention to international relative price misalignments, as the
exchange rate cannot be expected to correct them according to the classi-
cal view, and to consumer price in￿ ation, since with sectoral di⁄erences in
in￿ ation there are both supply and demand distortions. In general, how-
ever, it motivates neither complete stabilization of the CPI index, even in
the face of e¢ cient shocks, since the optimal trade-o⁄in stabilizing di⁄erent
components of CPI in￿ ation do not necessarily coincide with CPI weights,
nor curbing exchange rate volatility ￿ under the optimal policy, exchange
rate and terms of trade volatility can remain quite high under LCP.
Competitive devaluations and strategic interactions Policy trade-
o⁄s with an international dimension are also generated by cross-border
spillovers in quantities and prices when these give rise to strategic inter-
actions among policymakers ￿ one of the main topics of traditional policy
analysis in open economies (see, e.g., Canzoneri and Henderson 1991 and
Persson and Tabellini 1995). This chapter revisits classical concerns about
￿competitive devaluations￿in a modern framework, providing an instance of
a game between benevolent national monetary authorities, each attempting
to exploit the monopoly power of the country on its terms of trade to raise
national welfare.
Drawing on the literature, we focus on a Nash equilibrium assuming
complete markets and PCP. Depending on whether goods are complements
or substitutes in preferences, domestic policymakers have an incentive to
either improve or worsen their country￿ s terms of trade, at the cost of some
in￿ ation. These results appear to support the notion that strategic terms
of trade manipulation motivates deviations from domestic output gap sta-
bilization, and thus translates into either insu¢ cient or excessive exchange
rate volatility relative to the e¢ cient benchmark of policy cooperation (BB,
and De Paoli 2009a among others). However, in a global model, much of the
potential gains from national policies are o⁄set by the reaction of monetary
authorities abroad. The noncooperative allocation turns out to be subop-
timal for all. Despite strategic terms of trade manipulation, the deviations
8from the cooperative allocation actually are quite small.4
Indeed, gains from international policy coordination relative to Nash in
the class of models we consider may be small ￿ they are actually zero for
some con￿gurations of parameters ruling out cross-country spillovers rele-
vant for policymaking, (see, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti 2005, extending this
limiting result to LCP economies). The literature has recently emphasized
these welfare results as a reason for skepticism about international policy
cooperation (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 2002, Canzoneri et al. 2005). But the
issue of gauging gains from cooperation is actually wide open, especially in
the presence of real and ￿nancial imperfections that may induce national
central banks to play noncooperatively.
Currency misalignments and international demand imbalances
New directions for monetary policy analysis are emphasized in the last part
of this chapter, which widens the scope of our inquiry to ine¢ ciencies unre-
lated to nominal rigidities, stemming from arguably deeper and potentially
more consequential distortions. Namely, we study monetary policy trade-
o⁄s in open economies where asset market distortions prevent the market
allocation from being globally e¢ cient. Speci￿cally, because of distortions
resulting from incomplete markets, even if the exchange rate acts as a ￿shock
absorber￿moving only in response to current and expected fundamentals, its
adjustment does not necessarily contribute to achieving a desirable alloca-
tion. On the contrary, it may exacerbate misallocation of consumption and
employment both domestically and globally, corresponding to suboptimal
ex post heterogeneity across countries.
We ￿rst show that, relative to the case of complete markets, both the
Phillips curve and the loss function generally include a welfare-relevant mea-
sure of cross-country demand imbalances. This is the gap between marginal
utility di⁄erentials and the relative price of consumption ￿ which we dub
the ￿relative demand￿ gap. Such a (theoretically consistent) measure of
demand imbalances is identically equal to zero in an e¢ cient allocation. A
positive gap means that the Home consumption demand is excessive (rela-
tive to the e¢ cient allocation) at the current real exchange rate (i.e., at the
current relative price of consumption). With international borrowing and
lending, in addition, demand imbalances are re￿ ected by ine¢ cient trade
and current account de￿cits.
4An open issue is the empirical relevance of terms-of-trade considerations in setting
monetary policy ￿ a similar issue is discussed in the trade literature concerning the
relevance of the ￿optimal tari⁄ argument￿ .
9We then show that, with incomplete markets, optimal monetary pol-
icy has an ￿international dimension￿similar to the case of LCP: domestic
goals (output gap and in￿ ation) are traded o⁄ against the stabilization of
external variables, such as the terms of trade and the demand gap. A com-
parative analysis of these two cases however highlights di⁄erences in the
nature and size of the distortions underlying the policy trade-o⁄s with ex-
ternal variables, suggesting conditions under which ￿nancial imperfections
are more consequential for the conduct of monetary policy, compared to
nominal price rigidities in the import sector.
We derive targeting rules showing that the optimal policy typically acts
to redress demand imbalances ￿ containing the size of external de￿cits ￿
and/or correct international relative prices ￿ leaning against overvaluation
of the exchange rate ￿ at the cost of some in￿ ation. These targeting rules
are characterized analytically for economies in ￿nancial autarky. In these
economies, as stressed by Helpman and Razin (1978), Cole and Obstfeld
(1991) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), a mechanism of risk sharing is pro-
vided by relative price adjustment a⁄ecting the valuation of a country￿ s
output. Yet we show that no parameter con￿guration exists for which, in
the presence of both productivity and preference shocks, equilibrium terms
of trade movements automatically support an e¢ cient allocation in the ab-
sence of trade in assets ￿ the equivalence between ￿nancial autarky and
complete markets is possible only for each of these shocks in isolation.
We close the chapter by discussing the results in related work of ours
(Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2009b) for an economy in which households
can trade an international bond, suggesting that our analytical conclusions
for the case of ￿nancial autarky are a good guide to interpret the optimal
policy in more general speci￿cations of the incomplete market economy.
The text is organized as follows. In Part I, we assume complete markets,
and analyze optimal policies in PCP and LCP economies under cooperation,
as well as under Nash. In Part II, we allow for ￿nancial imperfection, and
discuss new policy trade-o⁄s when ￿nancial markets fail to support an e¢ -
cient allocation. Analytical details of the model and its solution are provided
in a web appendix.
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Optimal stabilization policy and
international relative prices with
frictionless asset markets
In this ￿rst part of the chapter, we study optimal monetary policy in open
economies in the context of a classical debate in international economics,
concerning the extent to which exchange rate movements can redress the
ine¢ ciencies in the international adjustment mechanism created by nomi-
nal and monetary distortions, and foster desirable relative price adjustment
across the border. To sharply focus on this issue, we follow much of the
literature on the subject, and carry out our analysis assuming complete and
frictionless asset markets. Under this assumption, we will contrast optimal
policy prescriptions coherent with two leading views.
One important view ￿ the classical view ￿ is that exchange rate move-
ments are e¢ cient (macro) shock absorbers, fostering relative price adjust-
ment between domestic and foreign goods in response to aggregate shocks.
By way of example, in response to a country-speci￿c positive supply shock,
a fall in the international price of domestic output can e¢ ciently occur
via nominal and real depreciation, which lowers the foreign-currency prices
of domestic exports while raising the domestic currency price of imports.
Consistent with this view, a high sensitivity of the price of imports to the
exchange rate ￿ imported in￿ ation ￿ is a desirable manifestation of real
price adjustment to macro disturbances.
However, in the data, exchange rate movements appear to be only weakly
re￿ ected in import prices, not only at the retail level, but also at the border.
The alternative view emphasizes that a high degree of stability in the prices
of imports in local currency questions the very mechanism postulated by the
classical view. To the extent that a low exchange rate pass-through re￿ ects
nominal rigidities ￿ that is, export prices are sticky in the currency of the
destination market ￿ nominal depreciation does not lower the relative price
of domestic goods faced by the ￿nal buyers worldwide, hence it does not
redirect demand towards them.
A further dimension of the classical debate on the role of the exchange
rate in the adjustment of international relative prices in the goods market
concerns the possibility that countries engage in strategic manipulation of
the terms of trade ￿ e.g. according to the logic of ￿ competitive devaluation.￿
11In such case the market allocation would not be e¢ cient because policymak-
ers fail to internalize cross-border monetary spillovers. On the contrary, they
intentionally use monetary instrument to exploit the monopoly power that a
country may have on its terms of trade, and/or their ability to a⁄ect relative
prices. As a consequence, prices may be misaligned relative to the e¢ cient
allocation.
In what follows, Section 2 will ￿rst lay out our analytical framework.
Section 3 and 4 will characterize optimal stabilization policy under the two
contrasting views regarding the stabilizing properties of the exchange rate
brie￿ y discussed above. Section 5 will analyze a world equilibrium in the
absence of international policy cooperation.
2 A baseline monetary model of macroeconomic
interdependence
2.1 Real and nominal distortions in New Keynesian open-
economy analysis
Our analysis builds on a two-country, two-good open-economy model which,
by virtue of its analytical tractability, has become a standard reference for
monetary analysis in international economics, at least since Obstfeld and Ro-
go⁄ (1995) ￿ the contribution starting the so-called New Open Economy
Macroeconomics (an important precursor being Svensson and van Wijnber-
gen 1989). In the model, each economy is specialized in the production of one
type of good supplied in many varieties, all traded across borders. Since the
preferences of national consumers need not be identical, the consumption
basket and therefore its price will generally be di⁄erent across border. Even
when the law of one price holds for each individual good/variety, the relative
price of consumption ￿ that is, the real exchange rate ￿ will ￿ uctuate in
response to shocks, and the purchasing power parity (PPP) will fail in gen-
eral. In addition, nominal rigidities can also be envisioned to bring about
deviations from the law of one price at the level of individual good variety.
In that case, the relative price of imports and exports will not coincide with
the terms of trade.
In this workhorse model, nominal rigidities interact with three other
sources of distortions. The ￿rst is monopoly power in production, as in the
(closed-economy) new-Keynesian model. The other two are speci￿c to inter-
national analysis, and consists of incentives to deviate from globally optimal
policies stemming from the assumption that countries have monopoly power
12on their terms of trade, and imperfections in international ￿nancial markets.
In the ￿rst part of the chapter, we will proceed under the assumption that
￿nancial markets are complete ￿ so that the only policy trade-o⁄s will be
raised by distortions related to nominal rigidities and, when we look at non-
cooperative policies, a country￿ s monopoly power on its terms of trade. The
policy implications of ￿nancial market imperfections will instead be analyzed
in the second part of the chapter.
In this section we will lay out the model in its general form, including
features from which we will abstract in the course of our analysis, but could
be useful for exploring generalization of our results. Namely, in our gen-
eral setup we model a demand for money balances assuming that liquidity
services provides utility. For comparison with the bulk of New-Keynesian
analysis, however, our analysis of the optimal policy will proceed as if our
economies were de facto cashless, ignoring this component of utility. Sec-
ond, our general setup account for di⁄erent degree of openness (asymmetric
home-bias in demand) and country size (di⁄erent population). To keep our
exposition as compact as possible, however, Phillips curve and optimal policy
will be derived imposing symmetry in these two dimensions. Finally, while
our setup below explicitly accounts for the government budget constraint, in
the rest of the chapter we will abstract from ￿scal spending positing G = 0.
2.2 The setup
The world economy consists of two countries, dubbed H (Home) and F
(Foreign). It is populated with a continuum of agents of unit mass, where
the population in the segment [0;n) belongs to country H and the population
in the segment (n;1] belongs to country F. Each country specializes in one
type of tradable good, produced in a number of varieties or brands with
measure equal to population size.5
2.2.1 Preferences and households￿decisions
The utility function of a consumer j in country H is given by

































5A version of the workhorse model with ￿rm entry can build on Bilbiie Ghironi and
Melitz (2007).
13Households obtain utility from consumption and the liquidity services of
holding money, while they receive disutility from contributing to the pro-
duction of all domestic goods yt (h) with a separable disutility. Variables
￿C;t; ￿M;t; ￿Y;t denote country speci￿c shocks to preferences towards con-
sumption, real money balances and production, respectively. Risk is pooled
internally to the extent that agents participate in the production of all goods
and receive an equal share of production revenue. We assume the follow-
ing functional forms, widely used in the literature and convenient to obtain








































Households consume both types of traded goods. So Ct(h;j) and Ct(f;j)
are the same agent￿ s consumption of Home brand h and Foreign brand f. For
each type of good, we assume that one brand is an imperfect substitute for
all other brands, with constant elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1. Consumption









































; ￿ > 0: (4)
6We follow BB in the functional form of the disutility of labor; it could be reconciled
with CGG by assuming ￿
￿(1+￿)
Y;t :
14where aH and aF are the weights on the consumption of home and foreign
goods, respectively, normalized to sum to 1, and ￿ is the constant elasticity
of substitution between CH and CF. Note that this speci￿cation generates
home bias if aH >
1
2
: Also, consistent with the assumption of specialization
in production, the elasticity of substitution is higher among brands produced
within a country, than across types of national goods, that is, ￿ > ￿:








where PH;t is the price sub-index for home-produced goods and PF;t is the





















Foreign prices, denoted with an asterisk like all the foreign variables, are


















. Even if the law of one price holds for each good
individually (i.e., Pt(h) = EtP￿
t (h) and Pt(f) = EtP￿
t (f)), di⁄erences in the
optimal consumption baskets chosen by households imply that the price of
consumption is not equalized across border. In other words, with di⁄erent
preferences, purchasing power parity (i.e., Qt = 1) will not hold. In addition
to the real exchange rate, another international relative price of interest is
the terms of trade, that is the price of imports in terms of exports. For the





From consumers￿ preferences, we can derive household demand for a
generic good h, produced in country H, and the demand for a good f,























15assuming the law of one price holds, total demand for good h and f can













































where Gt and G￿
t are country-speci￿c government spending shocks, under
the assumption that the public sector in the Home (Foreign) economy only
consumes Home (Foreign) goods and has preferences for di⁄erentiated goods
analogous to the preferences of the private sector.
2.2.2 Budget constraints and Euler equations
The individual ￿ ow budget constraint for the representative agent in the
Home country can be generically written as:7
Mt+BH;t+1+
Z
qH;t+1 (st+1)BH;t+1 (st+1)dst+1 ￿ Mt￿1+(1+it)BH;t+BH;t




￿ PH;tTt ￿ PH;tCH;t ￿ PF;tCF;t;
where BH;t is the holdings of state-contingent claims, priced at qH;t, paying
o⁄one unit of domestic currency in the realized state of the world as of t, st;
and it is the yield on a domestic nominal bond BH;t, paid at the beginning
of period t in domestic currency but known at time t ￿ 1, whose associated
















determining the intertemporal pro￿le of consumption and savings. Likewise,























7BH;t denotes the Home agent￿ s bonds accumulated during period t ￿ 1 and carried
over into period t.
16The government budget constraints in the Home and Foreign economy








































Fluctuations in proportional revenue taxes ￿t (￿￿
t), or government spending
Gt (G￿
t), are exogenous and completely ￿nanced by lump-sum transfers, Tt
(T￿
t ), made in the form of domestic (foreign) goods.
2.2.3 Price-setting decisions
Prices follow a partial adjustment rule ￿ la Calvo-Yun. Producers of dif-
ferentiated goods know the form of their individual demand functions and
maximize pro￿ts taking overall market prices and products as given. In each
period a fraction ￿ 2 [0;1) of randomly chosen producers is not allowed to
change the nominal price of the goods they produce. The remaining fraction
of ￿rms, given by 1￿￿ chooses prices optimally by maximizing the expected
discounted value of pro￿ts. When doing so, ￿rms face both a domestic and
a foreign demand. In principle, absent arbitrage across border, ￿rms could
￿nd it optimal to choose di⁄erent prices.8 Moreover, they may preset prices
either in domestic or in foreign currency.
Price setting under PCP The NOEM literature after Obstfeld and
Rogo⁄(1995) posits that prices are rigid in currency of the producers: ￿rms
set export prices in domestic currency, letting the foreign currency price
of their product vary with the exchange rate. This hypothesis is dubbed
￿ producer currency pricing￿or PCP. Let Pt(h) denote the price optimally
chosen by the ￿rm h for the domestic market at time t. To keep notation
as simple as possible let fEtP￿
t (h)g denote the price chosen for the foreign
market, expressed in domestic currency (under PCP, Et and P￿
t (h) move
proportionally, as exchange rate pass through on import prices is complete).
8See Corsetti and Dedola (2005) for an analysis of optimal pricing under an no-arbitrage
constraint.
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where revenues and costs are measured in utils and an asterisk denotes prices
in Foreign currency. Let yd
t+s (h) be the total demand of the good at time
t+s under the circumstances that the prices chosen at t Pt(h) and EtP￿
t (h)




































































Note that the last term on the left hand side of each condition is the demand
for the good h in the Home and Foreign market, respectively, at the price
chosen at time t ￿ these two terms indeed sum up to yd (h). Let ￿t denote
the markup charged by the ￿rm
￿t ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿t+s)
which we assume subject to shocks due to time-varying taxes on producers















t+s = 0 (16)
EtP￿
t (h) = Pt (h) for all h
18As demand elasticities are constant and symmetric across borders, ￿rms will
optimally choose identical prices for both their domestic and their export
markets: the law of one price will hold independently of barriers to good
markets integration. The above solution hence implies
EtP￿
H;t = PH;t and PF;t = EtP￿
F;t
With PCP, it is easy to see that the terms of trade move one-to-one with the
exchange rate, as well as with the domestic relative price of imports faced
by consumers: Tt = PF;t=EtP￿
H;t = EtP￿
F;t=PH;t = PF;t=PH;t.
Since all the producers that can choose their price set it to the same
value, we obtain two equations which describe the dynamic evolution of
PH;t and PF;t :
P1￿￿
H;t = ￿P1￿￿
H;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)Pt(h)1￿￿; (17)
P￿1￿￿
F;t = ￿￿P￿1￿￿
F;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)P￿
t (f)1￿￿:
where ￿￿ denotes the probability that Foreign producers do not re-optimize
prices during the period.
Price setting under LCP The PCP assumption is questioned by
an important strand of the literature (pioneered by Betts and Devereux
2000), subscribing the alternative view that ￿rms preset prices in domestic
currency for the domestic market, and in foreign currency for the market
of destination. This hypothesis is dubbed ￿ local currency pricing￿or LCP.
Under this hypothesis, ￿rms choose P￿
t (h) instead of EtP￿
t (h) and the ￿rst-








































We assume that when a ￿rm can re-optimize, it can do so both in the
domestic and export markets. With LCP, for a ￿rm not re-optimizing its
price, exchange rate pass-through is zero.
Let ￿t denote deviations from the law of one price (LOOP): for the
Home country, we can write ￿H,t = EtP￿
H;t=PH;t. As P￿
H;t and PH;t are sticky,
the law of one price is violated with any movement in the exchange rate.
19Speci￿cally, nominal depreciation tends to increase the Home ￿rms￿receipts
in Home currency from selling goods abroad, relative to the Home market:
nominal depreciation raises ￿H,t. Because of deviations from the LOOP, the
Home terms of trade Tt = PF;t=EtP￿
H;t will generally be di⁄erent from the
domestic price of imported goods, PF;t=PH;t. The dynamic evolution of the
prices indexes PH;t, P￿
H;t; PF;t and PF;t is now described by four equations
analogous to (17).9
2.2.4 International asset markets and exchange rate determina-
tion
Exchange rate determination crucially di⁄ers depending on the asset market
structure. We contrast below the complete and the incomplete markets case,
the latter including economies in ￿nancial autarky, as well as economies with
a limited number of assets traded across borders.
Complete markets Under complete markets, price equalization in
the state-contingent claims denominated in Home currency BH;t, implies the






























Combined with the assumption of initially zero net foreign assets, this equa-











For given Home and Foreign monetary policy, this equation fully determines
the exchange rate in both nominal and real terms. A key feature of the
complete-market allocation is that, holding preferences constant, Home per
capita consumption can raise relative to Foreign per capita consumption
only if the real exchange rate depreciates.
9While we focus our analysis on symmetric economies, asymmetric pricing pattern are
also plausible. A particularly interesting one follows the assumption that all export prices
are preset in one currency, that is, a case of ￿ dollar pricing.￿ Using our model, the case
of dollar pricing can be modelled by combining the assumption of PCP for the ￿rms in
one country, and LCP for the ￿rms in the other. Optimal policy with dollar pricing is
analyzed by Devereux et al. (2005) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2008) ￿ see also Goldberg
and Tille (2008) for evidence.
20Incomplete-market economy: ￿nancial autarky In this alterna-
tive setup, the economy does not have access to international borrowing or
lending. As only domestic residents hold the Home currency Mt, the in-
dividual ￿ ow budget constraint for the representative agent j in the Home
country is:




￿ PH;tCH;t ￿ PF;tCF;t: (20)
Barring international trade in asset, under ￿nancial autarky the value
of domestic production has to be equal to the level of public and private




Pt(h)yt(h)dh ￿ PH;tGt: (21)
By the same token, the inability to trade intertemporally with the rest of the
world imposes that the value of imports should equal the value of exports:
nPF;tCF;t = (1 ￿ n)EtP￿
H;tC￿
H;t: (22)
Using the de￿nitions of terms of trade Tt and real exchange rate Qt; we can
rewrite the trade balance condition in terms of aggregate consumption:
n(1 ￿ aH)T
1￿￿





For given monetary policy in the two countries, it is this equation ￿ bal-
anced trade ￿ that determines exchange rates.
Incomplete-market economy: trade in some assets Intermediate
cases of ￿nancial markets in between the two polar cases above can be mod-
elled by allowing for cross-border trade in a limited number of assets. Home
and Foreign agents hold an international bond, BH, which pays in units of
Home currency and is zero in net supply. In addition they may hold other
securities in the amounts ￿it; yielding ex post returns in domestic currency
Rit. The individual ￿ ow budget constraint for the representative agent in
the Home country therefore becomes:10
Mt + BH;t+1 +
X
i








￿ PH;tTt ￿ PH;tCH;t ￿ PF;tCF;t: (24)
10BH;t and ￿it denote the Home agent￿ s assets accumulated during period t ￿ 1 and
carried over into period t.
21In this case, price equalization across internationally traded assets will imply







































which holds for each individual asset (or portfolio of assets). The case of
international trade in one bond is easily obtained from the above imposing
￿it = 0:
We stress two notable di⁄erences between the complete-market and the
incomplete-market economy. First, while exchange rates re￿ ect only shocks
to fundamentals (thus acting as ￿ shock absorber￿ ) in both economies, when
markets are incomplete their equilibrium value will di⁄er from the e¢ cient
one, irrespective of nominal rigidities, due to this form of asset market fric-
tions.
A second important di⁄erence in the equilibrium allocation with com-
plete and incomplete markets is that international risk sharing will generally
be imperfect, resulting in ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations in aggregate demand across
countries, as shocks open a wedge between national wealth. Let Dt denote
the welfare-relevant cross-country demand imbalance, de￿ned as the follow-














By (19), under complete markets Dt is identically equal to one regardless of
the shocks hitting the economy. With incomplete markets, instead, Dt will
generally ￿ uctuate ine¢ ciently contingent on shocks.11 Because of ine¢ cient
relative prices and cross-country demand ￿ uctuations, we will see below that
optimal monetary policy will di⁄er across structures of international asset
markets.
2.3 Natural and e¢ cient allocations (Benchmark ￿ exible-
price allocations)
Allocations under ￿ exible prices provide natural benchmarks for comparison
across di⁄erent equilibria under sticky prices. Without nominal rigidities,
11Viani (2010) provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of Dt.











































































































(1 ￿ aH) n
1￿nQ
￿￿














whereas, holding the law of one price, the terms of trade and the real ex-

















H + (1 ￿ a￿
H)Tt
1￿￿
aH + (1 ￿ aH)Tt
1￿￿;
Throughout the chapter, the model￿ s equilibrium conditions and con-
straints will be written out in log-deviations from steady-state ￿ assum-
ing that in steady-state the net foreign asset position is zero. Denoting
with an upper-bar steady-state values, b xt = lnxt=x will represent devia-
tions under sticky prices, while e xt = lnxt=x will represent deviations un-
der ￿ exible prices. Recalling that ￿ denote the equilibrium markup (￿t =
￿=((￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿t))), a log-linear approximation around the steady-state of
23the above equations will yield:
e Qt = (a￿ + a ￿ 1) e Tt (29)









































C;t ￿ ￿ e C￿

























































where a, a￿,Y , Y
￿, G, and G
￿ are de￿ned as follows:










1￿￿; 1 ￿ a =
(1 ￿ aH)T
1￿￿
















































To solve for the world competitive allocation, we need a further equa-
tion, characterizing exchange rate determination. As discussed above, the
equilibrium will crucially di⁄er depending on the structure of international
￿nancial markets. With complete markets, the relevant equation is (19),













For the case of ￿nancial autarky, instead, the relevant equation is (23), which
becomes
e Qt =
a￿ + a ￿ 1
￿(a￿ + a) ￿ 1
￿




Observe that, relative to the case of complete markets (19), the real exchange
rate is still proportional to the ratio of consumption across countries. Yet,
under ￿nancial autarky, the proportionality coe¢ cient, rather than being
equal to ￿ the (inverse of the) intertemporal elasticity, is a function of ￿;
the trade elasticity, and of aH, the degree of home bias in consumption.
24Moreover, shocks to marginal utility do not enter directly into this relation.
In light of these two observations, it is easy to see that the two conditions
indeed coincide if there are no preference shocks, and ￿ = a￿+a￿1
￿(a￿+a)￿1, in
which case the equilibrium movements of international prices in response to
shocks perfectly insure national households against country-speci￿c macro
risk. We will return on this point in the last section of the chapter.
The system of equations (29) and either (30) or (31) provides a syn-
thetic representation of macroeconomic interdependence in a global equilib-
rium under either complete asset markets, or international ￿nancial autarky,
mapping all the shocks in the four endogenous variables
￿
e Qt; e Ct; e C￿
t and e Tt
￿
.
Following the monetary literature, the natural-rate allocation is de￿ned
as the decentralized market allocation in which all prices are ￿ exible (de-
rived above). A second allocation of interest is the one that would be chosen
by a benevolent planner. In our model, by the ￿rst welfare theorem, this ef-
￿cient allocation is equivalent to the decentralized equilibrium with ￿ exible
prices and complete markets, in which markups levels and ￿ uctuations are
neutralized with appropriate subsidies (￿t = 0), so that UC (￿)
PH;t






t = V ￿
y (￿). In what follows, we will denote the e¢ cient allo-
cation (corresponding to (a) complete markets, (b) ￿ exible prices and (c)
production subsidies such that ￿t = 0) with a superscript ￿ fb￿ .
In general, the international transmission of shocks can be expected to
be shaped by a large set of structural characteristics of the economy, ranging
from ￿nancial market development and integration, to vertical interactions
between producers and retailers, which are not accounted for by our work-
horse model. One advantage of the workhorse model speci￿ed in this section
is that, with complete markets and ￿ exible prices, it yields an admittedly
special, yet intuitive and parsimonious benchmark characterization of the
international transmission, stressing output linkages.
In each country, both the natural-rate output (de￿ned under ￿ exible
prices) and the e¢ cient level of output (which with complete markets coin-
cides with the natural rate without markup shocks) are functions of output
in the other country. To see this most clearly, impose symmetry (n = 1￿n
and aH = 1 ￿ a￿
H), and derive the expressions relating output to the terms
of trade and fundamental shocks. For the ￿rst-best allocation, we have
(￿ + ￿) e Y
fb






￿ (1 ￿ aH)
￿




+b ￿C;t + ￿b ￿Y;t (32)
(￿ + ￿) e Y
fb






+ (1 ￿ aH)
￿






C;t + ￿b ￿
￿
Y;t
whereas the terms of trade can in turn be written as a function of relative
25output and preference shocks
h




















Based on the above three equations, the literature has emphasized the terms
of trade channel of transmission, through which foreign shocks, such as gains
in productivity b ￿
￿
Y;t, a⁄ect the level of activity in the Home country, e Y
fb
H;t via
movements in relative prices. It is easy to see that, through this channel,
the Home and Foreign output will move either in the same or in the opposite
direction depending on whether ￿￿ < 1; or ￿￿ > 1.
In the parameterization of the workhorse model, as is well known, when
the intra-temporal elasticity ￿ is higher than the inter-temporal elasticity
1=￿; the two goods are substitute in the Pareto-Edgeworth sense: if ￿￿ > 1;
the marginal utility from consuming the Home good is decreasing in the con-
sumption of the foreign good. The opposite is true if ￿￿ < 1, the two goods
are complements. A key implication is that a depreciation of the Home terms
of trade increases (in case of substitutability) or decreases (complementar-
ity) the world demand for Home goods12 ￿ generating negative (positive)
comovements in output.13
However, note that the value of ￿￿ alone does not fully characterize the
cross-border output spillovers. To see this, set ￿ = ￿ = 1 in the above ex-
pression. While the ￿rst-best levels of output become insulated from terms of
trade movements, national outputs remain interdependent, as they respond
to preference shocks abroad independently of the terms-of-trade channel. In
turn, the terms of trade now change one-to-one with output di⁄erential, but
also move proportionally to the di⁄erential in preference shocks indepen-
dently of output movements:










￿ (2aH ￿ 1)
￿




Note that similar considerations apply to the natural-rate allocation, whereas
e Y
fb
H;t in the above equations is replaced with






12In light of this observation, one could interpret the parameter governing the ￿ marginal
propensity to import￿in the Mundell-Fleming model as stressing complementarity between
domestic and foreign goods.
13From a planner perspective, complementarity means that an increase in the supply of
one good makes the other good more socially valuable, hence providing a welfare rationale
for positive co-movements in output.
26As already stated at the beginning of this section, for the sake of ana-
lytical tractability, in the rest of this chapter we will focus on a version of
the model in which openness and population are symmetric across countries,
abstracting from ￿scal policy altogether (setting G = 0). We will also ignore
utility from liquidity services.
2.4 The open-economy Phillips curve
Allocations with nominal rigidities are characterized below by deriving coun-
terparts to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in our open-economy
model. This is accomplished by log-linearizing the equations for the price
setting decisions ((16) with PCP, and (??) with LCP) and the evolution for
the price indexes ((17) with PCP and their counterparts with LCP). While
the speci￿c form of the NKPC will of course vary with the speci￿cation of
price setting as well as of the international asset markets, it is nonetheless
useful to write a general expression, encompassing di⁄erent cases.
We start by writing Home in￿ ation of the domestically produced good as
a function of expected in￿ ation and current marginal costs (corresponding
to the expression in squared brackets below):
￿H;t = ￿Et￿H;t+1+
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 + ￿￿)
h
￿ b Ct ￿b ￿C;t + ￿
￿
b YH;t ￿b ￿Y;t
￿
+ b ￿t + (1 ￿ aH)
￿
b Tt + b ￿H,t
￿i
The expression for the marginal cost already sheds light on how macroeco-
nomic interdependence can a⁄ect the dynamics of domestic prices: the level
of activity in the foreign country is bound to a⁄ect marginal costs to the
extent that it a⁄ects, given openness 1 ￿ aH, domestic consumption and
international relative prices, here expressed in terms of changes in the terms
of trade and deviations from the law of one price (for the Home good):
b Tt + b ￿H,t.
Now, the aggregate demand for domestic output (9) in log-linear form is












Using the de￿nition of Dt (26)
b Dt = ￿
￿
b Ct ￿ b C￿
t
￿
￿ b Qt ￿
￿





to substitute out the consumption di⁄erential, we can also express Home
aggregate demand as follows:
￿ b Ct = ￿b YH;t ￿ (1 ￿ aH)
h
￿￿b Tt + (￿￿ ￿ 1) b Qt ￿ b Dt ￿
￿





27Combining this with the equation (32) for the ￿rst-best output e Y
fb
H;t; we
can ￿nally derive the open-economy NKPC in its general form:
￿H;t = ￿Et￿H;t+1 + (37)
















b Tt ￿ e T
fb









In the closed-economy counterpart of our model (aH = 1), the expression
above coincides with the Phillips curve in the baseline New-Keynesian spec-
i￿cation with only one sector: in￿ ation is a function of expected in￿ ation,
the gap between output and its e¢ cient level, usually dubbed the welfare
relevant output gap, and markup shocks.
In open economies (aH < 1), however, in￿ ation responds to additional
factors. First, there are cross-country misalignments in international rela-
tive prices of goods (b Tt+b ￿H,t) as well as in the relative price of consumption,
b Qt, both measured with respect to their e¢ cient levels e T
fb
t and e Q
fb
t . For
future reference, note that the relative price terms drop out from the NKPC
in the particular case in which ￿￿ = 1. Second, there is the welfare-relevant
measure of cross-country demand b Dt. Since b Dt = 0 in the e¢ cient alloca-
tion with perfect risk sharing, b Dt can be referred to as a relative demand
imbalance. As discussed below, these two additional factors, not present
in the canonical close-economy Phillips curve, will concur in shaping fun-
damental trade-o⁄s among di⁄erent objectives of monetary stabilization in
open economy.
It is worth pointing out that some of these trade-o⁄s have an obvious
counterpart in a closed-economy model with two sectors, in which the pa-
rameter aH would index the weight of the two goods in consumption. With
a representative agent, the Phillips curve for sectoral in￿ ation (see, e.g.,
Woodford 2003, chapter 3) is also a function of the e¢ cient gap of the rel-
ative price between the two goods, b Tt ￿ e T
fb
t in our notation. A number of
di⁄erences nonetheless arise because in the canonical closed-economy model
there is one representative agent supplying labor inputs to the two sectors,
while in an open-economy setting, there are multiple agents with generally
di⁄erent preferences, supplying good-speci￿c labor inputs. So, in addition
to the fact that in closed-economy analyses the output gap is usually re-
ferred to as aggregate output, the coe¢ cient multiplying relative prices is
a function of labor elasticity, that is, ￿￿ + 1; instead of 1 ￿ ￿￿. Further-
more, price discrimination and deviations from the law of one price b ￿H,t
are only conceivable in a heterogenous-agent economy. In comparing the
28two settings, a ￿nal important issue refers to the possibility of aggregating
multiple agents into a world representative agent ￿ as discussed below, this
will require either the assumption of complete markets within and across
borders, or some restrictions on preferences and shocks.
3 The classical view: divine coincidence in open
economies
3.1 Exchange rates and e¢ cient international relative price
adjustment
In this section, we characterize optimal stabilization policy under the main-
tained hypotheses that markets are complete, and prices are sticky in the
currency of the producers, so that in foreign markets the local-currency
price of exports varies in each period with the movement in the exchange
rate. This insures that the same product sells for the same price across
markets ￿ruling out deviations from the law of one price, in our notation
b ￿H,t = b ￿F,t = 0.
With complete pass-through, a monetary expansion which causes nomi-
nal depreciation raises the price of imports in domestic currency, and lowers
the price of export in foreign currency, making domestic products cheaper
worldwide: both PF;t=PH;t and its foreign counterpart rise. These move-
ments in relative prices within each market translate into weaker terms
of trade for the Home country: as both P￿
F;t and PH;t are sticky, Tt =
EtP￿
F;t=PH;t and Et move in the same direction. Nominal exchange rate move-
ments have ￿ expenditure switching e⁄ects￿ , as Home depreciation switches
domestic and foreign demand in favor of the Home goods.
The notion that nominal depreciation causes a fall in the relative interna-
tional price of tradables accords well with the classical model of international
monetary transmission, viewing exchange rate movements as a substitute for
product price ￿ exibility in fostering international relative price adjustment
vis-￿-vis macroeconomic shocks. However, for relative price adjustment via
exchange rate to be e¢ cient, as implicitly envisioned by the classical view,
a high pass-through on import prices is not enough. E¢ ciency also require
perfect risk sharing. This observation can be best appreciated by combin-
ing the two log-linearized equations for demand for goods produced in each
29country ((35) and its foreign counterpart) as to obtain:
b YH;t ￿ b YF;t = 4aH (1 ￿ aH)￿b Tt + (2aH ￿ 1)
￿
b Ct ￿ b C￿
t
￿





b Dt + b Qt +
￿




whereas we have imposed the law of one price consistent with the PCP
assumption, and in the second line we have made use of (36). From the
above expression, it is easy to verify that, holding the perfect risk sharing
condition b Dt = 0, the equilibrium relation between the terms of trade and
relative output is identical to the one derived under the ￿rst-best allocation
(33):
h
4aH (1 ￿ aH)￿￿ + (2aH ￿ 1)
2
i
b Tt = ￿
￿









It follows that, once monetary policy closes output gaps, international prices
will correspondingly align to their e¢ cient level too. This will not be true, in
general, if the PCP assumption is not complemented by the complete-market
assumption, so that b Dt 6= 0.
The implications for in￿ ation dynamics of the international transmission
mechanism in the case of PCP and complete markets are summarized by the
following two Phillips curves, one tracing the dynamics of in￿ ation in Home
currency for the good produced at Home, the other the dynamics of in￿ ation
in foreign currency for the good produced in the Foreign country:
￿H;t ￿ ￿Et￿H;t+1 =









+ b ￿t ￿ (1 ￿ aH)2aH (￿￿ ￿ 1)
￿







(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)









t + (1 ￿ aH)2aH (￿￿ ￿ 1)
￿




By improving the Home terms of trade, an increase in foreign output can
increase or reduce Home marginal costs (the term in squared brackets) and
thus Home in￿ ation, depending on whether ￿￿ is above or below unity.
Intuitively, as argued by CGG 2002 p. 887, an improvement in the terms
of trade means a fall in the price of imports ￿ everything else equal, this
reduces Home wages. Under perfect risk sharing, however, a higher foreign
30output translate into higher Home consumption for given relative prices ￿
this raises marginal costs, as it increases the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. The second e⁄ect prevails if the two goods
are substitutes: higher foreign output raises home marginal costs.
With complete markets and nominal rigidities in the currency of the
producers, the natural output gap can be obtained from the e¢ cient one
simply subtracting markup shocks (simply use (34)):




H;t + b ￿t=(￿ + ￿)
i
: (39)
It is then straightforward to rewrite the above Phillips curves in terms of
the natural output (and international price) gaps, instead of welfare-relevant
gaps. By doing so, it becomes apparent that policies keeping the natural
gaps completely closed at zero at all times in both countries can support
the ￿ exible-price allocation. This is because, as monetary policy expands
in response to a positive productivity shock or to a negative markup shock
(hitting symmetrically all ￿rms in a country), the exchange rate depreciates
exactly as much as it is required to move the international relative price of
Home output to its ￿ exible-price level (see (38), ￿ in close accord to the
classical adjustment mechanism envisaged in the well-known contribution
by Friedman (1953).
We nonetheless stress two observations. First, the exchange rate does
not stabilize prices independently of the way monetary policy is conducted.
Speci￿cally, the international relative prices adjust to their ￿ exible-price
allocation level only if monetary policy leans against (natural) output gaps.
Second, a ￿ ex-price equilibrium is not necessarily e¢ cient ￿ e.g. it will
not be so in the presence of markup shocks. We will explore these issues in
greater detail below.
3.2 Optimal policy
We characterize the optimal monetary policy by analyzing cooperative welfare-
maximizing policies under commitment. We take a timeless perspective and,
for analytical convenience, focus on the case in which monopolistic distor-
tions in production are o⁄set by appropriately chosen subsidies. This im-
plies that, in a cooperative solution, the steady-state is e¢ cient, and we can
derive a quadratic approximation of the objective function for the coopera-
tive problem without using second order approximations to the competitive
equilibrium conditions (see Benigno and Woodford 2006).
With complete markets and PCP, the arguments of the loss function
consists of deviations of output from the e¢ cient benchmark (the welfare-
31relevant output gaps) and in￿ ation in either country, plus a relative price
gap, measuring the deviations of international prices from their e¢ cient level
￿ the latter term can be expressed using either the terms of trade or the real
exchange rate (or even using the di⁄erence between output gaps combining
(38) and (33), a point further discussed below).
Assuming symmetry for simplicity, the purely quadratic ￿ ow loss ‘CM￿PCP
t
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(40)
where all the gaps are derived relative to the ￿ ex-price benchmark ignoring
markup shocks, as these would not be accommodated by the social planner.
The terms in in￿ ation in the loss re￿ ect the fact that benevolent policy-
makers are concerned with ine¢ ciencies in the supply of goods, due to price
dispersion in the domestic and in the export destination markets, similarly
to the closed-economy case. Note that, when there are no deviations from
PPP, i.e., aH =
1
2
, the above loss coincides with the one derived by BB: the




The optimal policy is characterized by the ￿rst-order conditions for the
optimal policy problem under commitment, with respect to in￿ ation:
￿H;t : 0 = ￿￿
￿(1 + ￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿H;t ￿ ￿H;t + ￿H;t￿1 (41)
￿￿
F;t : 0 = ￿￿
￿￿ (1 + ￿￿)





where ￿H;t and ￿￿
F;t are the multipliers associated with the Phillips curves
￿ whose lags appear re￿ ecting the assumption of commitment; and with
14For a small open economy limit of the same analysis see Gal￿ and Monacelli 2005 and
Faia and Monacelli 2008.
32respect to output:
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2￿H;t;
where we have used the equilibrium relation (38) between terms of trade and
relative output, and imposed the appropriate initial conditions consistent
with taking a timeless perspective (see Woodford (2003)).
Summing and subtracting the above ￿rst-order conditions, optimal pol-
icy can be conveniently expressed in terms of targeting rules by substituting
out the Lagrange multipliers from the ￿rst-order conditions relative to out-
put. In the tradition of open-economy macro, it is natural to express the
targeting rules in cross-country sum
0 =
h￿



























































































Under cooperation, the optimal monetary policy faces a global trade-o⁄ be-
tween stabilizing changes in world output gaps and world producers￿in￿ ation
33(also corresponding to world CPI in￿ ation, because of PCP), as well as a
cross-border trade-o⁄between stabilizing output gaps and in￿ ation at coun-
try level, and stabilizing relative in￿ ation and international relative prices
around their e¢ cient level.
From (38) and (33), however, it follows that under complete markets and
PCP the gap in the terms of trade and the output gap are linearly related
to each other:




















implying no trade-o⁄ between stabilizing international relative prices and
stabilizing output gaps across countries. We therefore have an important
open-economy instance of ￿ divine coincidence￿among potentially contrast-
ing objectives. Indeed, combining the above expressions, the optimal coop-
erative policy can be decentralized in terms of two targeting rules expressed
in domestic objectives only:
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In conjunction with the Phillips curves, these rules suggest a key result: the
optimal policy prescription in this benchmark open-economy model with
PCP and complete markets is identical to the one in the baseline closed-
economy one-sector model with ￿ exible wages (see the chapter by Woodford
in this Handbook).15 Note that under these conditions foreign shocks are
relevant to domestic policymaking only to the extent that they in￿ uence
domestic output gap and in￿ ation. The optimal policy prescription draws a
crucial distinction between e¢ cient and ine¢ cient shocks.16
In response to shocks of the e¢ cient shocks, such as productivity and
preference shocks, the ￿ ex-price allocation is e¢ cient: policymakers mini-
mize the loss by setting GDP-de￿ ator in￿ ation identically equal to zero, so as
15In a closed-economy framework, a trade-o⁄between output gap and in￿ ation stabiliza-
tion arises, for instance, because of multiple sectors (see e.g. Aoki 2001), or the presence
of a cost channel (see e.g. Ravenna and Walsh 2006).
16While the optimal target criteria have been expressed as ￿ exible in￿ ation targets, they
can alternatively be expressed in the form of output-gap-adjusted price level targets, as
shown in the chapter by Woodford. A target criterion of this form makes it clear that the
regime is one under which a rational long-run forecast of the price level never changes,
stressing the role of optimal monetary policy as a nominal anchor to manage and guide
expectations.
34to keep the (welfare-relevant) output gap closed at all times. Under the opti-
mal policy, the nominal and real exchange rates ￿ uctuate with these shocks
and adjust international relative prices without creating any policy trade-
o⁄: the terms of trade are at their (e¢ cient) ￿ exible-price level. By way
of example, under the optimal policy trend-stationary productivity gains
in one country are matched by an expansion of domestic monetary policy,
stabilizing domestic prices while in turn causing nominal and real depreci-
ation ￿ the country￿ s terms of trade weakens exactly as they would under
￿ exible prices. Under the optimal policy, the behavior of the world economy
in response to these shocks is completely characterized by the benchmark
allocation described in Section 2.
Conversely, in response to ine¢ cient ￿ such as markup ￿ shocks, the
optimal policy re￿ ects fundamental trade-o⁄s between output gap, in￿ ation
and relative price stabilization. As stressed by the new-Keynesian literature,
markup shocks create a wedge between e¢ cient and natural output. In the
closed-economy counterpart of our model, the optimal policy prescribes par-
tial accommodation, letting output fall and in￿ ation rise temporarily in the
short-run, while simultaneously committing to a persistent contractionary
policy in the future (see Gal￿ 2008, Woodford 2003). The same is true in
open economies.
While the optimal targeting rule are the same as in the baseline New
Keynesian closed-economy model, in interdependent economies, the response
of output gaps and in￿ ation to fundamental shocks will generally be shaped
by cross-border spillovers. The sign and magnitude of these spillovers will
in turn a⁄ect the implementation of the optimal policy. By way of example,
consider the optimal response to markup shocks. Combining the targeting
rules with the Phillips curves yields the following characterization of the
optimal path of output in the two countries:
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35It is apparent that cross-country output spillovers depend on ￿￿. Posit
a favorable markup shock in the Home economy, b ￿t < 0. According to
the ￿rst equation above, by accommodating in part such a shock, the Home
policymakers let domestic output increase (and domestic GDP in￿ ation fall),
causing the Foreign country￿ s terms of trade to worsen. These domestic
developments a⁄ect the Foreign economy. If goods are substitutes, i.e.,
￿￿ > 1, the Home terms-of-trade depreciation driven by higher Home output
raises the marginal costs of foreign producers. According to the second
equation, the Home expansion indeed translates into the equivalent of an
adverse cost-push shock abroad ￿Foreign output falls, opening a negative
output gap, while Foreign producer prices rise. Under the optimal policy,
the Foreign monetary authorities counteract the rise in in￿ ation, with the
result of feeding the Home terms of trade appreciation.17 The comovements
between national output gap, in￿ ation and monetary stance are negative.
Figure I.1
International transmission of a decline in Home markups under
the optimal policy with Producer Currency Pricing and complete
markets
These results are illustrated by the right-hand column of Figure I.1,
showing, for the Home and the Foreign country, the response of output, GDP
in￿ ation, and the terms of trade (proportional to the real exchange rate) to a
favorable markup shock in the Home economy, under the assumption of PCP
and complete markets. The di⁄erences between the case of substitutability
(￿￿ > 1) discussed above, and that of complementarity (￿￿ < 1), shown
by the graphs on the left-hand column of the Figure, are apparent. With
complementarity, a favorable markup shock b ￿t < 0 causes output gaps to
rise and in￿ ation to fall on impact worldwide ￿ comovements are positive.
This is because Foreign marginal costs and prices drop with the expansion
in Home output ￿ the Foreign economy experiences a favorable cost-push
shock. As the Foreign monetary authorities optimally accommodate such
shock by expanding, they partly o⁄set the initial terms of trade movement
￿ everything else equal, the Home terms of trade depreciation is slightly
milder with ￿￿ < 1 than with ￿￿ > 1.
17Observe that in equilibrium there will be a feedback from the drop in Foreign output
onto Home output ￿ akin to a favorable markup shock (see the ￿rst equation), thus
going in the same direction of the initial cost-push impulse on in￿ ation. These e⁄ects are
quantitatively small however.
36In the literature, some contributions have used the complete-market
model as a benchmark to assess how openness a⁄ects the slope of the IS
curve and the Phillips curve. CGG, for instance, notes that, when out-
put spillovers are negative (goods are substitute), openness raises the semi-
elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to the interest rate (see also
Clarida 2009): central banks get more ￿ bang￿out of every basis point by
which it changes interest rates. The case of positive spillovers (goods are
complement) is instead closer to the prediction of traditional frameworks
such as the Mundell-Fleming model, that openness induces ￿ leakages￿of ag-
gregate demand in favor of foreign output and employment. Central banks
thus get less ￿ bang￿on aggregate demand out of interest rate movements.
Similarly, under complete markets, changes in domestic output have less
of an impact on marginal costs, as the domestic consumption index (and
therefore marginal utility) does not move one-to-one with domestic produc-
tion, and its cost varies with the terms of trade. When goods are substi-
tutes, the former (income) e⁄ect dominates the latter, resulting in a ￿ atter
Phillips curve. When goods are complements, openness makes the Phillips
curve steeper.
While stark and intuitive, however, these results derived under complete
markets and PCP are not an exhaustive characterization of the way in which
openness and globalization of real and ￿nancial markets a⁄ect the slopes
of the IS and the NKPC. More general results can be derived from more
comprehensive speci￿cations of the model ￿ a promising area for further
research.18
4 Skepticism on the classical view: local currency
price stability of imports
4.1 Monetary transmission and deviations from the law of
one price
In the previous section, import prices were assumed to move one-to-one
with the exchange rate (as a simpli￿cation, at the border as well as at retail
level). This is seemingly at odds with the ￿nding of empirical studies, which
document that import prices are rather stable in local currency. While the
observed local-currency price stability of imports arguably re￿ ects to a large
18For a debate on the e⁄ect of globalization on the in￿ ation process, see Ball (2006),
Bean (2007), Rogo⁄ (2003) and Sbordone (2009) among others, as well as the literature
after early empirical work includes Romer (1993).
37extent local costs, especially at the consumer level, and destination-speci￿c
markup adjustment ￿ that is, real factors ￿ , many authors have embraced
the idea that price stickiness nonetheless plays an important role in explain-
ing this evidence. In this section we discuss the international transmission
mechanism and the optimal policy design under the assumption that im-
port prices are subject to nominal-pricing distortions in the currency of the
market of destination ￿ an hypothesis commonly labelled ￿ local currency
pricing￿or LCP. For simplicity, we will consider the extreme assumption that
nominal distortions are the only factor explaining import price stability ￿
thus abstracting from real determinants. Also for simplicity, we will impose
perfect symmetry in parameters￿value, including the probability of resetting
prices (￿ = ￿￿) so that, up to a ￿rst-order approximation, deviations from
the law of one price will be symmetric across countries b ￿H,t = b ￿F,t = b ￿t.
With LCP, the law of one price does not generally hold, since when
export prices are sticky in local currency, exchange rate ￿ uctuations drive the
domestic-currency price of exports away from the price ￿rms charge in the
domestic market. Rather than raising the domestic price of imports, nominal
depreciation of the Home currency increases the Home ￿rms￿revenue from
selling a unit of goods abroad relative to the Home market, corresponding to
a rise in ￿H,t = EtP￿
H;t=PH;t. Thus, for any given volume of sales in foreign
currency, Home depreciation raises the corresponding revenues in domestic
currency accruing to the exporting ￿rms. Since the relative price of imports
faced by national consumers, PF;t=PH;t and P￿
F;t=P￿
H;t, are little responsive
to exchange rate movements, nominal depreciation tends to improve, rather
than worsen, the terms of trade of a country, as it increases the purchasing
power of domestic residents for any level of economic activity.
Exchange rate pass-through is on average far from complete: it is positive
for the ￿rms which re-optimize prices during the period, as these optimally
pass some of the marginal cost movements onto local prices, compensat-
ing for exchange rate movements; it is zero for the prices charged by the
other ￿rms, which do not re-optimize during the period. For the ￿rst group
of ￿rms, nominal depreciation reduces their prices relative to foreign prod-
ucts ￿ ceteris paribus, this works towards worsening the country￿ s terms
of trade. For the other ￿rms, nominal depreciation instead raises the local-
currency revenue from selling goods abroad at an unchanged price ￿ this
works towards improving the country￿ s terms of trade. Which e⁄ect pre-
vails will depend on the degree of price stickiness (Corsetti, Dedola, and
Leduc 2008b). Thus, while nominal depreciation will always be associated
with real depreciation, it can either weaken or improve the terms of trade
of the country as a whole. Di⁄erent from the classical view, nominal ex-
38change rate movements cannot be expected to have ￿ expenditure switching
e⁄ects:￿nominal depreciation does not necessarily make goods produced in
the country cheaper worldwide, thus re-allocating demand in favor of them.
The real exchange rate and the terms of trade no longer move in direct
proportion to each other, as nominal depreciation also causes deviations
from the law of one price
b Qt = (2aH ￿ 1) b Tt + aH
￿
b ￿H,t + b ￿F,t
￿
= (2aH ￿ 1) b Tt + 2aHb ￿t; (47)
where because of symmetry in the probability ￿ = ￿￿, b ￿H,t = b ￿F,t = b ￿t.
LCP has thus key implications for the transmission mechanism. Speci￿cally,
even if markets are complete, the equilibrium relation between relative out-
put and international prices is not identical to the ￿rst best, because of
deviations from the law of one price:
h
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￿ [4aH (1 ￿ aH)￿￿ + 2aH (2aH ￿ 1)] b ￿t
By way of example, if Home monetary policy eases in response to a positive
productivity shock and closes the output gap, the ensuing nominal depreci-
ation of the Home currency will bring about deviations from the law of one
price, preventing the Home terms of trade from adjusting to their e¢ cient
(￿ ex-price) level.
Cross-border monetary spillovers are quite di⁄erent from the PCP case.
Rearranging aggregate demand under LCP, write






b Tt + b ￿t
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First, nominal appreciation now strengthens the real exchange rate, but
tends to weaken the terms of trade, with opposite e⁄ects on consumption:
consumption spillovers are less positive than under PCP. Second, consump-
tion responds to international relative prices even when ￿￿ = 1. In other
words, monetary spillovers play an important role in shaping macroeconomic
interdependence, independently of the distinction between goods comple-
mentarity and substitutability, which is instead central to understanding
spillovers in the PCP economy.
There are now four relevant NK Phillips curves, one for each combination
of goods (H or F) and destination market (with or without a star ￿). These
39four Phillips curves now track the behaviour of in￿ ation at consumer price
level, in local currency:
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(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 + ￿￿)
b ￿t;
whereas the in￿ ation di⁄erential between Home produced goods and imports
is related to changes in the terms of trade and in the deviations from the
law of one price by the following identity:
￿F;t ￿ ￿H;t = b Tt ￿ b Tt￿1 + b ￿t ￿ b ￿t￿1; (49)
an identity which is to be included as an additional constraint in the policy
problem solved below.
To appreciate the di⁄erence relative to the PCP case, suppose that
monetary authorities target zero in￿ ation for domestically produced goods
￿H;t = 0, which requires no change in producers￿marginal costs under all
contingencies. The Phillips curves above together with (??) suggest that
closing output gap will be ine⁄ective towards this goal. Rather, a target of
zero in￿ ation could only be pursued at the cost of variability in output gaps
and ine¢ cient misalignment and dispersion in prices (including deviations
from the LOOP) across all categories of goods.
Moreover, with LCP, a Home depreciation has an asymmetric e⁄ect on
the price dynamics of domestically produced goods in domestic and foreign
currency. A Home depreciation also makes foreign consumer price in￿ ation
(￿￿
H and ￿￿
F) larger than the domestic one (￿H and ￿F.)
404.2 Optimal policy: trading o⁄ in￿ ation with domestic and
international relative price misalignment
With LCP, the ￿ ow loss function under cooperation and commitment, as
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(50)
Comparing this and the loss function under PCP (40), cooperative poli-
cymakers still dislike national output gaps and in￿ ation, as well as cross-
country di⁄erences in output gaps, to the extent that these lead to mis-
alignments in international relative prices. Yet, relative to the PCP case,
the relevant in￿ ation rates are measured at consumer level, and thus dif-
fer across domestic goods and imports. In addition, there is a new term
re￿ ecting deviations from the law of one price.
The four di⁄erent terms in in￿ ation in the loss function re￿ ect the fact
that, with LCP, policymakers are concerned with ine¢ ciencies in the supply
of each good, due to price dispersion in the domestic and in the export desti-
nation markets. Observe that in our symmetric speci￿cation, the quadratic
in￿ ation terms are weighted according to the corresponding shares in the
consumption basket.19
Furthermore, because of the presence of a term in ￿t, losses from mis-
alignments in relative prices would arise even if output could be brought to
its e¢ cient level. Deviations from the law of one price lead to ine¢ ciencies
in the level and composition of global consumption demand, a point espe-
cially stressed by the LCP literature assuming one-period preset prices ￿
see, e.g., Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
The optimal policy is characterized by the following ￿rst-order conditions
19In more general speci￿cations with asymmetries in nominal rigidities and thus in
Phillips Curve parameters, it will not be possible to aggregate national CPI in￿ ation
components according only to the CPI weights.
41for in￿ ation
￿H;t : 0 = ￿￿
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and for deviations from the LOOP:
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42where ￿H;t and ￿￿
H;t (￿F;t and ￿￿
F;t) are the multiplier associated with the
Home (Foreign) Phillips curves (??) ￿ whose lags appear re￿ ecting the
assumption of commitment, and ￿t is the multiplier associated with the
additional constraint arising under LCP (49).
As before, we can summarize these conditions by deriving two targeting
criteria, one expressed in terms of global objectives, the other in terms of rel-
ative objectives. The ￿rst targeting criterion is readily obtained by summing
the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to output and in￿ ation rates:
0 =
h￿































Similarly to the PCP economy, the policymakers seek to stabilize a linear
combination of changes in the world output gap and world price in￿ ation.
Under LCP, however, the latter is de￿ned using consumer prices only ￿
under PCP, instead, world in￿ ation could be expressed using either consumer
or producer prices.
Obtaining the second targeting criterion under LCP is more involved.
An instructive way to write this criterion in its general form consists of
combining a di⁄erence equation in the multiplier ￿t; obtained using the ￿rst
order conditions for b YH;t; b YF;t and b ￿t and in￿ ation to eliminate the other
multipliers:
￿ 2(2aH ￿ 1)￿
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43with a solution for the same multiplier, given by
￿2(2aH ￿ 1)￿







































































Observe that, contrary to the PCP case, the relative criterion generally
combines both a ￿ exible in￿ ation target and a price level target in terms
of consumer prices, also adjusted to take into account relative price mis-
alignments rather than the output gap. Moreover, the targeting rule will
generally include the di⁄erential between GDP de￿ ators across countries
(
￿





(1 ￿ aH)￿F;t + aH￿￿
F;t
￿
), in addition to the







Under LCP, cross-country di⁄erentials in good-speci￿c in￿ ation are opti-
mally traded o⁄s with cross-country di⁄erentials in output gaps and relative
price misalignments, including deviations from the law of one price. Thus,
while optimal policy still pursues global CPI in￿ ation targeting and world
output gap stabilization (according to the global criterion), global stabi-
lization generally comes at the expense of the stabilization of national CPI
in￿ ation and output gaps, as well as international prices.20
While the expression for the relative targeting criterion is not immedi-
ately intuitive, it greatly simpli￿es under two alternative assumptions: either
a linear disutility of labor (￿ = 0) ￿ the case stressed by Engel (2009) ￿
or purchasing power parity in the ￿rst best, re￿ ecting identical preferences
across goods (aH = 1=2) ￿ a case discussed by the early contributions to
the NOEM literature such as CGG and BB. Under either condition, the
multiplier ￿ drops from the targeting criterion, simplifying the analytical
characterization of the optimal policy (for instance, there is no longer a
trade-o⁄ between stabilizing the GDP and the CPI in￿ ation di⁄erential).
20It is instructive to compare the above expression with optimal targeting criteria de-
rived in models with multiple sectors, or featuring both price and wage rigidities (e.g.
Giannoni and Woodford 2009). A common feature is that the targets pursued by mon-
etary authorities involve linear combinations of current and expected changes in output
gaps and in￿ ation.
44Speci￿cally, using equation (47), the relative targeting criterion can be ex-

























Under either ￿ = 0 or aH = 1=2, the two targeting criteria ￿ in sum
and di⁄erence ￿ lead to clearcut policy prescriptions, spelled out by Engel
(2009) in his discussion of the case of linear disutility of labor. Namely, in
response to e¢ cient shocks, the optimal policy stabilizes the global welfare-
relevant output gap together with CPI in￿ ation in each country. With zero
CPI in￿ ation, in turn, satisfying the relative criterion coincides with cor-
recting misalignments in the real exchange rate.21
The latter result ￿ optimal real exchange rate stabilization ￿ helps
shedding light on recurrent claims in the literature that, under LCP, policy-
makers should be concerned with stabilizing consumption deviations from
their e¢ cient level. This is apparent from the targeting rule above, as with
complete markets, we can use the perfect risk-sharing condition to substi-
tute out the real exchange rate for relative consumption. The relative tar-
geting criterion indeed emphasizes the optimal trade o⁄between minimizing
di⁄erences in in￿ ation rates, and containing misallocation of consumption
across countries. In response to e¢ cient shocks, stabilization of (national)
CPI in￿ ation implies that cross-country consumption di⁄erentials are also
stabilized (see, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti 2005).
Using the following equilibrium relation between international relative
prices ￿ real exchange rates, the terms of trade and deviations from the
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the relative targeting criterion could also be written in a form more similar
21To see this, rearrange the Phillips curves (??) into global CPI in￿ ation and cross-
country CPI in￿ ation di⁄erentials. Under e¢ cient shocks global CPI in￿ ation is always
zero when the global output gap is closed. Relative CPI in￿ ation is also zero under either
PPP or linear disutility of labor when the real exchange rate gap is closed.
45to its counterpart for the PCP economy (44):
0 =
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As was the case for the PCP economy, the policy trade-o⁄ is between stabi-
lizing internal objectives (output gaps and an in￿ ation goal) across countries,
and stabilizing international relative prices. However, as argued above, with
LCP cross-country output gap stabilization no longer translates into terms
of trade stabilization. In response to productivity shocks, for instance, sta-
bilizing the marginal cost of domestic producers neither coincides with sta-
bilizing their markups in all markets, nor is su¢ cient to realign international
product prices. It is apparent that LCP breaks the ￿ divine coincidence￿in
open economy.
Furthermore, note that with no home bias in consumption preferences
(aH = 1=2), the e¢ cient real exchange rate is obviously constant ￿ PPP
would hold under ￿ exible prices. When PPP is e¢ cient, real exchange rate
stabilization implies a constant nominal exchange rate. Indeed, according to
the second targeting criterion (56), keeping the nominal exchange rate ￿xed
corrects real exchange rate misalignment ￿ in a PPP environment the sole
cause of deviations from the law of one price ￿ at the same time ruling out
cross-country misallocation in consumption. In this case, a ￿xed exchange
rate is indeed implied by the optimal policy in response to e¢ cient shocks,
although not to markup shocks. Unless PPP is e¢ cient, however, optimal
policy under LCP will not imply keeping the nominal exchange rate ￿xed
(a point stressed by Duarte and Obstfeld 2008; see also Corsetti 2006 and
Sutherland 2005).
It is worth stressing that the clearcut prescriptions of strict CPI in￿ ation
targeting and complete stabilization of real exchange rate misalignments
￿ speci￿c to economies in which either PPP is e¢ cient or ￿ = 0 ￿ do
not imply an overall e¢ cient allocation, as apparent from equation (58).
Under LCP, global stabilization is generally achieved at the cost of cross-
country and domestic ine¢ ciency, that is, ine¢ cient cross-country output
gap di⁄erentials, terms of trade misalignments and deviations from the law
of one price.
46For general speci￿cations of the model (with ￿ > 0 and e¢ cient devia-
tions from PPP), the optimal policy prescriptions are less clear-cut, re￿ ect-
ing the complexity of the trade-o⁄s among competing objectives accounted
for by the cross-country targeting criterion (??). The main lessons from
the analysis of optimal policy can nonetheless be ummarized as follows.
The presence of LCP entails that policymakers should pay more attention
to consumer price in￿ ation components (domestic goods and import in￿ a-
tion), rather than GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation, and to international relative price
misalignments. Yet, it motivates neither complete CPI stabilization within
countries, nor policies containing real exchange rate volatility.
To provide further insights on the optimal policy under LCP, we show
impulse-responses to di⁄erent shocks for the general case with home bias in
consumption and ￿ > 0. We start by reproducing in Figure I.2 the same
exercise of optimal stabilization of markup shocks as in Figure I.1. The strik-
ing di⁄erence between these ￿gures is that, with LCP, alternative values of
￿￿ are much less relevant for the direction of cross-border spillovers. With
import prices sticky in local currency, the Home expansion in response to a
favorable markup shock in one country creates positive output spillovers in-
dependently of the sign of ￿￿: in the ￿gure, output comovements are always
positive; CPI (but also GDP de￿ ator) in￿ ation comovements are always
negative. Yet the magnitude of ￿￿ still determines the response of marginal
costs to change in terms of trade and deviations from the law of one price,
and thus the optimal monetary policy stance. At the margin, the movement
in international prices is still slightly larger if ￿￿ > 1, compared to the com-
plementarity case, as was the case with PCP. Relative to the PCP economy,
however, international relative prices move in opposite directions: when the
Home real exchange rate depreciates, the terms of trade strengthen.
Figure I.2
International transmission of an exogenous decline in Home
markups under the optimal policy with Local Currency Pricing
and complete markets
Figure I.3 depicts impulse responses under the optimal policy to Home
shocks to productivity and preference (demand), for the benchmark calibra-
tion in Table I.1. Even if these shocks are e¢ cient, with LCP the optimal
policy cannot fully stabilize them. A positive productivity shock in the
Home economy (the graphs on the left-hand column of the Figure) opens
a negative output gap and translates into negative GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation
in the Home economy. The allocation in the Foreign country is once again
47determined by monetary spillovers, rather than by elasticity parameters (it
is assumed that ￿￿ > 1). In response to the Home productivity shock, a
Home expansion raises domestic demand, depreciating the exchange rate in
real and nominal terms, but improving the terms of trade in excess of their
e¢ cient levels. The Home expansion translates into excessive demand for
the foreign goods: the Foreign output gap turns positive, so does the For-
eign GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation. Observe that the rise in Foreign good prices in
Home currency is large enough to cause some overall CPI in￿ ation in the
Home country (despite the fall in the domestic GDP de￿ ator). However, the
CPI is stabilized to a much larger extent than the GDP de￿ ator.
The pattern of impulse responses is just the opposite for the case of a
positive Home preference shock, depicted on the right-hand column in the
Figure. The Home monetary authorities react to the in￿ ationary conse-
quences of higher domestic demand by contracting, thus appreciating the
currency. With LCP, however, a Home appreciation causes weaker terms of
trade, despite the stronger demand for Home output. Foreign output falls.
Once again, import prices move the CPI opposite relative to the GDP de-
￿ ator, corresponding to negative in￿ ation in the Home economy. Note that,
for either shock, the optimal policy induces a negative correlation of output
and CPI in￿ ation across border.
Figure I.3
International transmission of Home productivity and preference
shocks under the optimal policy with Local Currency Pricing
and complete markets
4.3 Discussion
Optimal stabilization and macro volatility To complement our ana-
lytical characterization of the optimal policy under PCP and LCP, we carry
out numerical exercises shedding light on the implications of pursuing the op-
timal policy for the volatility of macro variables of interest. The parameters
underlying our exercises are shown in Table I.1. Results are shown in Table
I.2, reporting the standard deviation of in￿ ation rates for the CPI and the
GDP de￿ ator, output gaps, markups, and international prices (relative to
output). The table contrasts PCP and LCP economies under complete mar-
kets, assuming either e¢ cient shocks only or e¢ cient and ine¢ cient shocks
together.
Table I.1 and I.2 here
48With an e¢ cient steady-state, the optimal policy under PCP reproduces
the ￿ exible-price e¢ cient allocation if there are only shocks to productivity
and preferences: markups, the output gap, and GDP-de￿ ator in￿ ation are all
perfectly stabilized. Monetary authorities are inward-looking in the sense
that they focus exclusively on stabilizing the prices of domestic products
in domestic currency, by virtue of the fact that, with the optimal policy
in place, import prices ￿ uctuate with the exchange rate to realign relative
prices. For this reason, monetary authorities should instead never respond
to ￿imported in￿ ation.￿At an optimum, CPI in￿ ation remains quite volatile.
In the presence of markup shocks, however, monetary authorities optimally
trade-o⁄ stabilization of markups and in￿ ation, with stabilization of output
gaps.
Compare these results with those reported for the LCP economy. Rela-
tive to the PCP case, it is apparent that the optimal policy no longer fully
stabilizes the domestic output gap, whether or not shocks are e¢ cient. The
volatility of CPI in￿ ation is lower than that of the GDP-de￿ ator in￿ ation.
This stems from the fact that the optimal policy attempts to stabilize a
weighted average of domestic and foreign-goods markups. Compared to the
PCP case, the optimal policy lowers the volatility of the terms of trade, but
not that of the real exchange rate, which can actually be more volatile in
the LCP than in the PCP economy.
The latter result deserves a comment. The impulse responses in Figure 3
suggest that, under the optimal policy, the gap between market and e¢ cient
real exchange rates is stabilized by more than the corresponding gap in the
terms of trade. In other words, the policymakers are relatively more con-
cerned with stabilizing the real exchange rate than the terms of trade. Yet,
from Table I.2 it is apparent that the volatility of the former is larger than
that of the latter in equilibrium. The two observations are obviously consis-
tent. Together they stress once again that what matters for policymakers are
welfare-relevant gaps, rather than variables in level. Speci￿cally, the lower
volatility of the terms of trade is explained by the fact that LCP induces a
negative covariance between the market and the e¢ cient level of the terms
of trade ￿ such a covariance is instead positive for the real exchange rate.22
Sources of Local Currency Price Stability of Imports The analy-
sis of optimal policy contrasting PCP and LCP raises issues in the extent
to which the local currency price stability of imports can be considered
22See Svensson (2002) for an analysis of ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting, and its implications
on exchange rate volatility.in a small open economy context.
49evidence in favor of nominal frictions, as postulated by LCP, instead of re-
￿ ecting optimal markup adjustment by ￿rms (for an analysis of the latter,
see, e.g., Atkeson and Burstein 2008, Bergin and Feenstra 2000 Dornbusch
1987, Krugman 1987, and Ravn et al. 2007), or the incidence of local costs
in ￿nal prices (see, e.g., Burstein et al. 2005).23 If rooted in real factors, lo-
cal currency price stability is not necessarily incompatible with the classical
view attributing expenditure switching e⁄ects to exchange rate movements
(a point stressed by Obstfeld 2002).
Di⁄erent sources of local currency price stability can interact in deter-
mining the degree of exchange rate pass-through. In previous work of ours
(Corsetti and Dedola 2005 and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2009a), we have
shown how local costs and distributive trade can a⁄ect the demand elasticity
faced by exporters at the dock,24 making it market-speci￿c (hence creating
an incentive for cross-border price discrimination), and increasing in the
dock price (thus leading to incomplete exchange rate pass-through indepen-
dently of nominal rigidities).25 According to this model, even in the absence
of nominal frictions, exporters pass through to local prices only a fraction
of the change in marginal costs in local currency induced by exchange rate
movements.
In turn, allowing for nominal rigidities a⁄ecting both producers and re-
tailers in the same model does not necessarily lower pass-through ￿ nominal
rigidities at retail levels can actually raise the producers￿incentive to raise
local prices in response to exchange rate shocks. Real and (several layers of)
nominal rigidities in turn create trade-o⁄s between price stability and rela-
tive price adjustment, which need to be addressed by optimal stabilization
23Several empirical and theoretical works have shed light on the importance of real
factors in muting the adjustment of prices vis-￿-vis marginal costs ￿ uctuations driven by
the exchange rate (see, e.g., Goldberg and Verboven 2001, Goldberg and Hellerstein 2007,
and Nakamura and Zerom 2009).
24It is well understood that, even if exchange rate pass-through is complete, the incidence
of local costs can lower the elasticity of import prices at the retail level As stressed by
Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007), suppose that import prices at the dock move
one-to-one with the exchange rate ￿ the exchange rate pass-through correctly de￿ned
is complete ￿ but 50 percent of the retail prices is distribution margin, mostly covering
local costs. A 1 percent depreciation of the currency will then a⁄ect the ￿nal price of the
imported good only by 1/2 percent.
25In our work we have modelled upstream monopolists selling their tradable goods to
downstream ￿rms, which combine them with local inputs before reaching the consumer,
assuming that the two (tradable goods and local inputs) are not good substitutes in the
downstream ￿rms￿production The same principle nonetheless can be applied to models
where intermediate imported inputs are assembled using local inputs.
50policies.26
Endogeneity of LCP and the role of monetary policy A small but
important strand of literature has emphasized the need to treat the currency
denomination of exports as an endogenous choice by pro￿t maximizing ￿rms.
Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2005), Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004),
and Friberg (1998) have developed models where ￿rms can choose whether to
price exports in domestic or in foreign currency, knowing that price updates
will be subject to frictions. A number of factors ￿ from the market share
of exporters to the incidence of distribution and the availability of hedging
instruments ￿ potentially play a crucial role in this choice (see Engel 2006
for a synthesis).
Taylor (2000) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) speci￿cally discuss the role
of monetary policy in this choice. The former links low pass-through to a low
in￿ ation environment (see however Campa and Goldberg 2005 for evidence).
The latter stresses the systematic e⁄ects of monetary policy stabilization on
the covariance between exporters￿marginal costs and their revenues from the
foreign market. The key argument can be intuitively explained as follows:
consider a ￿rm producing in a country where monetary policy is relatively
noisy, that is frequent nominal shocks tend to simultaneously raise nominal
wages and depreciate the exchange rates. In this environment, by choosing
LCP, a ￿rm can secure that, whenever an unexpected monetary expansion
causes nominal wages and thus its marginal cost to rise, its export revenues
in domestic currency will correspondingly increase per e⁄ect of the nominal
depreciation ￿ with clear stabilizing e⁄ects on the ￿rm￿ s markup. The
opposite will be true for a foreign ￿rm exporting to the same country. By
choosing PCP this ￿rm can insulate its revenue, and therefore its markup,
from monetary noise.
We have seen above that benevolent policymakers choose their optimal
policy di⁄erently depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through
(PCP versus LCP). Firms, in turn, will choose optimal pass-through also
taking into account monetary policy. So, monetary policy and ￿rms￿pric-
ing strategies depend on each other, raising the possibility of interesting
interaction in general equilibrium.27
26For a small open-economy analysis see Monacelli (2005).
27Chang and Velasco (2006) reconsider the mechanism in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002),
to explain the way monetary policy can a⁄ect the choice of the currency denomination of
debt.
51Price indexes An important issue raised by the LCP literature concerns
the price index to be targeted by policymakers. LCP provides an argument
to use an index closer to the CPI than to the GDP de￿ ator ￿ depending on
the weight of imports in the consumption basket, but also on di⁄erences in
the degree of nominal distortions across the domestic and the import sector
(see, e.g., Smets and Wouters 2002).28
Similar considerations apply to PCP economies producing both traded
and nontraded goods whose prices are subject to nominal rigidities ￿ com-
plete stabilization of the GDP de￿ ator is therefore not attainable. Despite
PCP, under the optimal policy these economies behave pretty much like the
LCP economy in a key dimension: markups and output gaps are not stabi-
lized fully in response to e¢ cient shocks. Under a standard calibration of
sectoral shocks, real exchange rate volatility can actually be lower than in
the LCP case. The optimal price target is however still de￿ned in terms of
a (now composite) GDP de￿ ator only.
A relatively unexplored direction of research consists of allowing for
(staggered) wage contracts on top of price rigidities. As there is now a
feedback from ￿imported in￿ ation￿into optimal wage setting, sticky wages
might provide an argument for deviating from targeting the GDP de￿ ator,
and somewhat stabilize import prices even under PCP.
5 Deviations from policy cooperation and concerns
with ￿competitive devaluations￿
5.1 Bene￿ts and costs from strategic manipulation of the
terms of trade
A classical question in international monetary policy concerns the gains from
policy cooperation ￿ re￿ ecting the magnitude of cross-border monetary
and real spillovers as well as the modalities of strategic interactions among
independent policymakers. In this section, we analyze this issue by keeping
the assumption of complete markets and focusing on the Nash equilibrium
in the class of models analyzed by, e.g., BB, with the GDP in￿ ation rate
as the policy instrument. As for the case of cooperative policymakers, we
again characterize the optimal policy under commitment, assuming that
appropriately chosen subsidies ensure e¢ ciency of the steady-state.
As amply discussed in the literature, the allocations under international
28For an analysis of similar issues in a currency union, see Benigno (2004) and Lombardo
(2006). Adao et al. (2009) extends the analysis to optimal monetary and ￿scal policy.
52policy cooperation and Nash are not necessarily di⁄erent, but happen to
coincide under some special but noteworthy cases. One such special case is
discussed by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005),
specifying a model with symmetric Cobb-Douglas aggregator of consump-
tion, logarithmic preferences, no government expenditure, and, only produc-
tivity shocks.29 More generally, Cobb-Douglas preferences and logarithmic
utility in this list can be replaced by the condition ￿￿ = 1; as discussed
above, this condition implies that, under PCP, there are no cross-border
supply spillovers via the in￿ uence of terms of trade movements on marginal
costs with complete markets.30
Another special case is suggested by the literature based on Mundell-
Fleming (see, e.g., Canzoneri and Henderson 1991 and Persson and Tabellini
1995), concerning gains from cooperation when shocks are global and sym-
metric across countries. In the workhorse model, however these gains are
zero only in special cases ￿ i.e., global shocks only a⁄ect productivity pro-
vided government spending is zero. In general (e.g. with markup shocks),
even symmetric disturbances produce cross-country spillovers and thus cre-
ate room for improving welfare via cooperative policies.
With the exception of a few special cases, cooperative policies will gen-
erally be welfare improving. A speci￿c source of gains from cooperation is
the elimination of strategic manipulation of the terms of trade. In the tra-
ditional literature, a key argument in favor of cooperation indeed consists of
preventing ￿competitive devaluations,￿that is, attempts by one country to
manipulate the terms of trade in order to steal markets from foreign com-
petitors, to the bene￿t of domestic employment and output. Over the years,
the modern literature has thoroughly revisited the same argument, using the
expected utility of the representative consumer as the welfare criterion.
One feature di⁄erentiates the modern from the conventional analysis.
By analyzing the welfare incentive for policymakers to manipulate inter-
national prices, the modern literature makes it clear that these incentives
can go either way, depending on macroeconomic interdependence ￿ they
do not exclusively make domestic products cheaper. An intuitive account
of the gains from terms of trade manipulation is as follows. Assume that
our baseline model is in steady-state, and markups are zero per e⁄ect of
appropriate subsidies. Consider now the e⁄ect of a contraction in the pro-
duction of domestic goods, improving a country￿ s terms of trade. When
29See also Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Corsetti (2006).
30As noted by BB, the absence of cross-border supply spillovers per se does not rule out
gains from cooperation: in fact these materialize in the presence of, e.g., markup shocks
because of the interdependence of consumption utilities.
53goods are substitutes, the fall in domestic production reduces the disutility
of labor, without much e⁄ect on the utility from consumption. This is be-
cause, at better terms of trade, domestic households can now acquire more
units of foreign goods, which are good substitutes for the domestic one ￿
an argument which follows the same logic of the ￿optimal tari⁄￿in trade
theory. The opposite is true when goods are complements. In this case,
utility increases with a marginal increase in domestic production, even if
the country￿ s terms of trade worsen. As the extra production is exchanged
for foreign goods, a higher consumption of imports raises the marginal util-
ity from consuming domestically produced goods. Note that these e⁄ects
disappear when goods are independent, namely ￿￿ = 1:31
From the vantage point of a country, the macroeconomic advantages
from strategic manipulation of terms of trade can be fully appreciated in
analyses of small open economies facing a downward sloping demand for
their domestic products since in this case the analysis can abstract from
strategic interactions with the rest of the world (see, e.g., De Paoli 2009a).
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, instead, a country￿ s attempt to manipulate
terms of trade is in large part self-defeating, as such attempt is matched by
the policy response of the other country: in the noncooperative equilibrium
all players end up being worse o⁄relative to the cooperative one. In general,
output gaps will not be closed in equilibrium; there will instead be either
overproduction or underproduction.32
31The in￿ uence of monetary policy on a country￿ s real international prices has important
implications as regards the incentives faced by discretionary policymakers. Although the
chapter focuses on the case of full commitment, it is appropriate to discuss these incen-
tives, if only brie￿ y. In closed economy New Keynesian model, it is well understood that
monopolistic distortions in production create an incentive for discretionary policymakers
to engineer surprise monetary expansions, as to bring output closer to its e¢ cient level. In
an open economy, however, the country as a whole has also monopoly power on its terms
of trade: by causing depreciation, a surprise monetary expansion also worsens the inter-
national price of domestic output. For this reason, as discussed by Corsetti and Pesenti
(2001) and Tille (2001), discretionary policymakers will trade-o⁄ monopolistic distortions
in production and in the country￿ s terms of trade. Depending on the relative magnitude
of these distortions, a discretionary policymaker may have the incentive to either engineer
a surprise devaluation, although smaller than needed to make the economy produce its
e¢ cient level of output, or even to engineer an ex-post appreciation.
32As shown by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and (2005), Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002),
national policymakers can manipulate the country￿ s terms of trade by a⁄ecting the level
of prices set on average by ￿rms, via the in￿ uence of their monetary rules on the statistical
distribution of marginal costs and revenues (see Broda 2006 for evidence).
545.2 Optimal stabilization policy in a global Nash equilibrium
In order to characterize noncooperative policy, the modern intertemporal ap-
proach emphasizes the need to model fully speci￿ed dynamic games. Hence
the literature faces several important challenges, as regards the de￿nition of
equilibria (e.g., open- or closed-loop, discretion or commitment) and policy
instruments (in￿ ation, price level, output gaps), as well as the feasibility
of analytical solutions (complete and incomplete markets, distorted steady-
states) and implementation issues (interest rates or money) ￿ each passage
pointing to promising although di¢ cult avenues of research.33 In what fol-
lows, we focus on one of the few cases which has been fully worked out by the
literature. This is a two-country, open-loop Nash equilibrium under PCP,
with GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation rates as the policy instrument; see BB for the
analysis of an economy in which PPP holds. Revisiting this contribution, we
carry out numerical experiments presenting new results on the real exchange
rate behavior.
Figure I.4
Nash Gaps Following a Home Productivity Shock
The Nash policy from the vantage point of each country is character-
ized under commitment, positing an e¢ cient steady-state via appropriate
subsidies. The calibration is the same as in Table I.1. Results are shown
in Figure I.4. This ￿gure reports the di⁄erence in impulse responses to a
positive productivity shock in the Home country between the cooperative
case to the Nash-equilibrium. The two columns report results for di⁄erent
degrees of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, always as-
suming home bias in preferences: positing ￿ = 2, the column on the left
corresponds to the case of complementarity for ￿ = :3 so that ￿￿ < 1, the
column on the right to the case of substitutability for ￿ = :7, so that ￿￿ > 1
(the two allocations coincide in the case of independence, as discussed).
Relative to the e¢ cient terms of trade/real exchange rate depreciation
in the cooperative allocation, noncooperative policies lead to more or less
33Sims (2009) argues that even state-of-the-art exercises such as Coenen et al. (2009),
provide only prototype analysis of strategic monetary interactions, for several reasons:
(i) the features of the Nash equilibria studied depend crucially on many aspects of the
game, especially which variables each player treats as given when choosing the player￿ s
own moves; (ii) the reliance on equally unrealistic open-loop strategies (in which the entire
past and future of the other central bank￿ s instrument is taken as given) or ad-hoc (closed-
loop) strategies like simple rules; (iii) the lack of key features like valuation e⁄ects with
incomplete markets.
55depreciation in response to the shock, depending on the size of ￿￿. This sug-
gests that, with strategic interactions, exchange rate volatility will tend to
be lower in the case of substitutability and higher in the case of complemen-
tarity.34 An instance of excessive (￿ competitive￿ ) devaluation is detectable
for the case of complementarity (￿￿ < 1) ￿ in the other case (￿￿ > 1) the
Home country enjoys the bene￿ts of real appreciation, relative to the coop-
erative policy benchmark. Correspondingly, under Nash the movements in
the real rate relative to the e¢ cient allocation go in opposite directions in
either country.
In the case of ￿￿ < 1 ￿ corresponding to excessive depreciation ￿
Home output overshoots its ￿ ex-price level, so that the Home output gap is
opportunistically understabilized in response to productivity shocks. In the
case of ￿￿ > 1 the Home output gap is instead overstabilized: by keeping
output short of the ￿ ex-price level, the Home country can save on labor
e⁄orts and raise consumption utils by acquiring foreign goods (which are
good substitutes for domestic ones) at better terms of trade. In either case,
output gaps are not zero: because of the associated price dispersion and
relative price misalignment, the Nash allocation is clearly welfare-dominated
by price stability.
Figure I.5
Nash Gaps Following an Exogenous Decline in Home Markups
Similar patterns characterize the optimal response under Nash to a fa-
vorable markup shock in the Home economy, shown in Figure I.5. Both the
Home and the Foreign monetary stances are ine¢ ciently expansionary in
response to such a shock, to a degree that varies across parameter con￿gu-
rations. With goods substitutability, the Home terms of trade depreciation
causes Foreign output to fall. With goods complementarity, even though the
Home terms of trade deviates by less with respect to the e¢ cient allocation
(thus depreciating by more), a stronger global demand drives up Foreign
output. Conditional on markup shocks, the volatility of international prices
is again higher in the latter case.
In either ￿gure, observe that the di⁄erence between the two allocations
is strikingly small. In welfare terms, the gains from cooperation are close
34Interestingly, De Paoli (2009) notes that, in a noncooperative equilibrium, a small
country adopting a ￿xed exchange rate regime may increase its welfare, relative to regimes
involving some degree of exchange rate ￿ exibility. This is the case for a high enough
elasticity of substitution.
56to zero.35 Indeed, the literature has presented numerical assessments of the
benchmark model under complete markets which do not generate apprecia-
ble quantitative welfare gains from coordinating policies, relative to optimal
stabilization pursued by independent policymakers (engaging in strategic
manipulation of terms of trade). An important instance is Obstfeld and Ro-
go⁄ (2002), who forcefully stress the limited size of welfare gains as a novel
and independent argument feeding intellectual skepticism on the virtue of in-
ternational policy coordination ￿ supporting instead the principle of ￿keep-
ing one￿ s house in order￿as the foundation for an e¢ cient global economic
order.
Yet the debate over the gains from policy coordination is far from settled.
Gains may be signi￿cant in the presence of lack of commitment (see Cooley
and Quadrini 2003) or ine¢ cient shocks and real distortions, creating policy-
relevant trade-o⁄s which potentially enlarge the scope for policy con￿ icts
above and beyond strategic terms of trade manipulation36 ￿ magnifying
ine¢ ciencies from strategic interaction (see, for instance, Pappa 2004 and




In the ￿rst part of this chapter, we analyzed complete-market economies
in which optimal monetary policy redresses domestic nominal distortions
implementing the ￿ exible price allocation vis-Æ-vis e¢ cient shocks, and by
doing so it also corrects misalignments in the exchange rate ￿ in its dual role
of assets and goods price.37 Relaxing the assumption of complete markets,
we now study economies in which the ￿ exible price allocation results in ine¢ -
35In our calibration, in terms of steady-state consumption, the gains from cooperation
are essentially zero for productivity, taste, and markup shocks. The gains of cooperation
following markup shocks are about an order of magnitude bigger relative to the other two
shocks, but always tiny. To wit, with ￿ = 1 and no home bias, they amount to a mere
0.000263 percent of steady-state consumption.
36Admittedly, the literature has not (yet) settled on the question as of whether terms of
trade manipulation as a principle driving monetary policy is empirically relevant. To some
extent, this debate echoes the corresponding debate in the trade literature, concerning the
empirical relevance of the ￿optimal tari⁄￿argument.
37See e.g. the discussion in Devereux and Engel (2007), who develop a model with news
shocks after Beaudry and Portier (2006).
57cient levels of consumption and employment, both globally and within coun-
tries, as well as real currency misalignments, even when exchange rates only
re￿ ect fundamentals. These ine¢ ciencies create relevant trade-o⁄s for poli-
cymakers, raising issues about the extent to which monetary policy should
lean again misalignments and global demand imbalances.
In what follows, we ￿rst focus on the analytically convenient case of ￿-
nancial autarky, and derive closed-form expressions characterizing the equi-
librium allocation, the policy loss function, and the optimal targeting rules.
In light of this intuition, we then delve into numerical analysis of economies
where agents can borrow and lend internationally.
6 Macroeconomic interdependence under asset mar-
ket imperfections
6.1 The natural allocation under ￿nancial autarky
The key consequence of asset market imperfections and frictions for mone-
tary policy is that the ￿ exible-price allocation does not generally coincide
with the ￿rst-best allocation. To elaborate on this point, it is convenient to
focus on the special case of ￿nancial autarky, for which a number of results
can be derived analytically. In such a setup, households and ￿rms do not
have access to international borrowing or lending, nor to any other type
of cross-border ￿nancial contracts; consequently, there is no opportunity to
share risk across borders through asset diversi￿cation. As under complete
markets, we proceed assuming that the distribution of wealth across agents
is initially symmetric.
Barring international trade in assets, the value of domestic production
has to be equal to the level of public and private consumption in nominal
terms. By the same token, the inability to trade intertemporally with the
rest of the world imposes that the value of aggregate imports should equal
the value of aggregate exports. Using the de￿nitions of terms of trade Tt
and the real exchange rate Qt; we can rewrite the trade balance condition
in terms of aggregate consumption and the real exchange rate in log-linear
terms, similar to equation (31):
(2aH￿ ￿ 1) e Qt = (2aH ￿ 1)
￿




Proceeding as in Section 2, it is possible to show that under ￿ exible
58prices, Home and Foreign output will obey the following relations:
(￿ + ￿) e YH;t = (￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ aH) e Tt + ￿b ￿Y;t +b ￿C;t + b ￿t (60)








C;t + b ￿￿
t; (61)
whereas the terms of trade in turn can be written as a function of relative
output:
(1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)) e Tt = e YH;t ￿ e YF;t: (62)
Comparing these expressions with their ￿rst-best counterparts (32) and (33),
it is clear that the transmission of shocks will generally be very di⁄erent
under ￿nancial autarky, depending on the values of preference parameters
such as ￿ and ￿. For instance, because of imperfect risk sharing, a shock
that increases the relative supply of domestic output can now appreciate the
terms of trade and the real exchange rate, for a low enough trade elasticity,
i.e., for ￿ <
2aH ￿ 1
2aH
:38 Such appreciation would not be possible if markets
were complete (see (33)).
6.2 Domestic and global implications of ￿nancial imperfec-
tions
As shown in the previous section of the chapter, with PCP and complete
markets, markup shocks always move the economy away from the e¢ cient
allocation, creating welfare-relevant trade-o⁄s between output and price sta-
bility. The same will obviously be true under ￿nancial autarky. Under ￿nan-
cial autarky, however, the economy will generally be away from its ￿rst-best
allocation also in response to e¢ cient shocks.
The literature has paid attention to a few special but informative ex-
ceptions, whereas, despite imperfect capital markets, the ￿ exible-price allo-
cation is equal to the ￿rst-best allocation. This equivalence is possible by
virtue of the mechanism discussed by Helpman and Razin (1978) and Cole
and Obstfeld (1991): under some parameter con￿gurations, terms of trade
movements in response to shocks maintain the relative value of domestic to
foreign output constant, automatically delivering risk insurance, even in the
absence of trade in assets.39
38As discussed by Corsetti and Dedola (2005) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008a),
for a su¢ ciently low ￿, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises.
39Empirically, however, terms of trade ￿ uctuations tend to be larger than relative output
￿ uctuations. On the business cycle properties of terms of trade, see early evidence by
Mendoza 1995.
59The ￿ exible-price allocation under ￿nancial autarky will be e¢ cient if

















Expressing the endogenous variables in terms of relative output:
e Qt = (2aH ￿ 1) e Tt =
2aH ￿ 1
1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




e Ct ￿ e C￿
t
￿
= (2aH￿ ￿ 1) e Tt =
2aH￿ ￿ 1
1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
e YH;t ￿ e YF;t
￿
; (65)
and rearranging, (63) can be rewritten as:
￿ (2aH￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (2aH ￿ 1)
1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)
￿









Clearly, this condition cannot be satis￿ed in the presence of both preference
and technology shocks, when these are uncorrelated. In general, there is no
parameter con￿guration for which the ￿ exible-price allocation under ￿nan-
cial autarky can be expected to coincide with the ￿rst best, even when all
shocks are e¢ cient.
The e¢ cient and the ￿nancial autarky allocations can instead coincide
for each e¢ cient shock in isolation. Assuming technology shocks only, this
would be the case when parameters satisfy the following:




Note that, for ￿ = 1 ￿ the Cobb-Douglas aggregator of domestic and foreign
goods ￿ e¢ ciency requires utility from consumption to be logarithmic (￿ =
1) ￿ the case of macroeconomic independence (￿￿ = 1). This parameter
con￿guration has been amply analyzed by the monetary policy literature in
an open economy, after its characterization by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
When the above condition is violated, in response to fundamental tech-
nology shocks, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate will be mis-
aligned relative to the e¢ cient allocation, even under ￿ exible prices, while
consumption will be suboptimally allocated across countries. A useful result
follows from the fact that when ￿ ￿ 1; the sign of deviations from the above
equality indicates whether relative Home aggregate demand is too high or
too low, relative to the e¢ cient benchmark, in response to productivity
gains in one country. Namely, in the face of positive technology shocks in
60the domestic economy, Home aggregate demand will be too high for ￿ ￿ 1,
leading to a cross-country demand imbalance and domestic overheating ￿
a term that in our context is de￿ned as excessive demand and activity rel-




Correspondingly, the real exchange rate misalignment will take the form of
overvaluation or undervaluation, respectively.




comes relevant for our analysis. This case is extensively analyzed in Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2008a) who characterize it as a ￿negative transmission:￿
a positive technology shock associated with excessive relative aggregate de-
mand in the country experiencing it and real overvaluation ￿ brought about
by an appreciation of the country￿ s real exchange rate.
The conditions under which the ￿ ex-price and the ￿rst-best allocation
coincide are di⁄erent in response to preference shocks. Writing out (66) in
terms of these shocks only we have
[￿ (2aH￿ ￿ 1) ￿ (2aH ￿ 1)][(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ 2(1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)] = 1:
(68)
Note that a necessary condition for the above equality to hold is




implying that e¢ ciency under preference shocks is incompatible with e¢ -
ciency under technology shocks (see (67)). In general, as for the case of
technology shocks, the sign of the deviation from the above equality in-
dicates whether relative aggregate demand is too high or too low in one
country, with respect to the e¢ cient benchmark, leading to a cross-country
demand imbalance and domestic overheating under a policy of strict price
stability that reproduces the ￿ ex-price allocation.
6.3 Optimal policy: trading o⁄ in￿ ation with demand im-
balances and misalignments
We now proceed to characterize optimal monetary policy in economies with
incomplete markets and nominal rigidities ￿ focusing on the case of PCP.
Under ￿nancial autarky and PCP, the NK Phillips curves for the Home and
61Foreign GDP de￿ ator in￿ ation are:
￿H;t = ￿Et￿H;t+1 +
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With incomplete markets, the last term b Dt will generally not be zero, re-
sponding to fundamental shocks.
The monetary policy trade-o⁄s associated with ￿nancial autarky and
PCP are synthesized by the following ￿ ow loss function, derived under the
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:
(70)
The loss function under ￿nancial autarky di⁄ers from its counterpart with
complete markets (40) in two respects. First, the coe¢ cient on the terms
of trade gap has an additional term, because of the di⁄erent equilibrium
relation between relative output and international relative prices, dictated
by the requirement of a balanced trade. Second, in addition to deviations
from the e¢ cient level of domestic output and the terms of trade, the loss
function also depends on the deviations from the e¢ cient cross-country al-
location of aggregate demand, b Dt. In general, the objective function thus
includes well-de￿ned trade-o⁄s among policy objectives that are speci￿c to
heterogeneous agent economies: strict in￿ ation targeting will not be optimal,
even in response to e¢ cient shocks.
Taking, as before, a timeless perspective, the optimal cooperative policy
62is characterized by the following ￿rst-order conditions for in￿ ation:
￿H;t : 0 = ￿￿
￿(1 + ￿￿)
(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿H;t ￿ ￿H;t + ￿H;t￿1 (71)
￿￿
F;t : 0 = ￿￿
￿￿ (1 + ￿￿)





where ￿H;t and ￿￿
H;t are the multipliers on the Phillips curves ￿ whose lags
appear re￿ ecting the assumption of commitment ￿ and for output
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(1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)
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2aH (1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)
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b Dt +
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(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 + ￿￿)
(1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)
1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)
￿H;t +
￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿￿ (1 + ￿￿)
￿
￿ + ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)




whereas we have used the fact that both terms of trade b Tt and b Dt are linear
functions of relative output.
Summing up and taking the di⁄erence of the ￿rst-order conditions, op-
timal policy could be expressed implicitly in terms of a global targeting rule
that is identical to the one derived under complete markets and PCP (43):
0 =
h￿




























63and the following cross-country rule:
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4aH (1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)
1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
b Dt ￿ b Dt￿1
￿
Comparing this expression to the targeting criterion derived under com-
plete markets (44), observe that only the ￿rst two terms in output gaps
and in￿ ation di⁄erentials are identical. In line with the di⁄erences already
pointed out in our discussion of the loss functions, the incomplete mar-
kets rule depends on an additional term in b Dt, and the coe¢ cient of the
term in relative prices and in￿ ation di⁄erentials re￿ ects misalignments due
to balanced trade. Because of these misalignments, even under the special
conditions implying no misallocation in cross-country demand ( b Dt = 0), the
trade-o⁄ between relative in￿ ation and relative prices will generally not be
proportional to that between relative output gaps and relative in￿ ation in
the face of either supply or demand shocks (either (67) or (68)).
Useful insights on the international dimensions of the monetary policy
trade-o⁄s can be gained by comparing the above targeting rules under in-
complete markets and PCP with the ones derived under complete markets
and LCP ￿ emphasized by the literature as a case where the deviation from
the divine coincidence is speci￿cally motivated by openness-related distor-
tions (nominal rigidities in the import sectors). For the sake of tractability,
we carry out this comparison imposing the simplifying assumption ￿ = 0:
64We ￿rst rewrite the above decentralized targeting rule (74) replacing the
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4aH (1 ￿ aH)(￿ ￿ 1)
￿ [1 ￿ 2aH (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿
b Dt ￿ b Dt￿1
￿
as to make it directly comparable with the analogous targeting rule with
LCP and complete markets (??). Looking at the two expressions, it is
apparent that in either case optimal monetary policy has an international
dimension: domestic goals (in￿ ation and output gaps) are traded o⁄against
the stabilization of external variables. These external variables include the
real exchange rate and, for the economy under ￿nancial autarky, the demand
gap. However, at least two di⁄erences stand out. The ￿rst one concerns the
coe¢ cients of similar terms. In the economy with complete markets and
LCP, the coe¢ cients of the in￿ ation term and the real exchange rate gap
are ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0, respectively. In the economy analyzed in this section,
the corresponding coe¢ cients also depend on the degree of home bias aH
and on the elasticities ￿ and ￿; and can have either sign. This con￿rms the
idea that openness and elasticities are likely to play a key role in shaping
policy trade-o⁄s in open economies when markets are incomplete.
The second di⁄erence concerns the implications of the new term b Dt cap-
turing demand imbalances, which, recalling that e D
fb
t = 0; could be decom-
posed into two components, the terms of real exchange rate misalignments
and cross-country consumption gaps:






















In our analysis of the economy with LCP and complete markets, we have
seen that, if ￿ = 0, we can write the trade-o⁄ with relative (CPI) in￿ ation
either in terms of the cross-country consumption gap, or in terms of the
real exchange rate misalignment ￿ these are proportional to each other. A
similar result does not arise with incomplete markets, since, in this case, real
exchange rate misalignments depend on both the cross-country consumption
65gaps, and the output gap di⁄erentials as follows:
4(1 ￿ aH)aH￿￿
￿

































Hence, the non-in￿ ation terms in the targeting rule (76) are always a
function of both components of the demand gap. The intuition for such a
di⁄erence is straightforward: in contrast to the case of complete markets,
closing the real exchange rate misalignments under ￿nancial autarky does
not automatically redress the relative consumption gap, thus posing a trade-
o⁄ for optimal monetary policy.
Further insights can be gained by combining the target criteria, rewriting
them in terms of decentralized rules speci￿c to each country ￿ again for ￿ =
0. Focusing on the Home country, the decentralized rule in the incomplete-
market, PCP economy is:
0 = ￿￿H;t +
h￿
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b Dt ￿ b Dt￿1
￿
It is useful to write out the corresponding rule under complete markets and
LCP as follows:
0 = ￿(aH￿H;t + (1 ￿ aH)￿F;t) +
h￿
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Comparing the two expressions above, it is apparent that optimal monetary
policy trades o⁄ output gaps and in￿ ation against the stabilization of the
terms of trade, and either deviations from the law of one price for the LCP
complete-market economy, or the demand gap for the economy under ￿nan-
cial autarky and PCP. Interestingly, however, these trade-o⁄s are shaped
by di⁄erent parameters, particularly concerning the coe¢ cients multiplying
66the external variable objectives, which can be quite large in the ￿nancial au-
tarky economy, particularly under parameterizations for which ￿ (1 ￿ 2aH￿)
is close to 2(1 ￿ aH) in value. This suggests that the trade-o⁄s with exter-
nal variables related to incomplete market distortions can be signi￿cant,
compared to the ones related to multiple nominal distortions, as thoroughly
investigated in related work of ours (Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2009b).
To conclude our analysis, it is worth commenting on the optimal policy
under a special parameterization of the model assuming log utility and a
Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator, that is, ￿ = ￿ = 1, recurrent in the
literature after Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). Using our analytical results, it is
easy to verify that, under PCP, the expressions for the target criteria under
￿nancial autarky and complete markets coincide, without however implying
the same allocation outcomes. The reason for the discrepancy in allocations
is that, while the two targeting criteria are formally identical, the welfare-
relevant output gaps behave di⁄erently across the two market structures.
As already shown above, under ￿nancial autarky and ￿ = ￿ = 1 the ￿ exible
price allocation is only e¢ cient in response to productivity shocks, not to
preference shocks.
To wit, using the Phillips curves, it is easy to verify that, if ￿ = ￿ = 1,








= (1 ￿ aH)
￿











= (1 ￿ aH)
￿





whereas by (66)), under the relevant parameterization, b Dt is equal to the
negative of the preference shock di⁄erential
￿




, and thus is in-
dependent of policy. Ine¢ cient output gaps in turn translate into terms of
trade and real exchange rate misalignments. Namely, under ￿nancial au-
tarky, (62) implies that a positive Home output di⁄erential ￿ whatever its
origin ￿ cannot but weaken the country￿ s terms of trade. Conversely, in
the ￿rst-best allocation, a positive Home output di⁄erential resulting from a
shock to Home preferences is associated with stronger Home terms of trade











￿ (2aH ￿ 1)b ￿C;t = ￿
￿
1 + ￿
(2aH ￿ 1)b ￿C;t:
In light of (??), it immediately follows that the resulting misalignment is of
67the same sign as the preference shocks:





[1 + ￿ (2aH ￿ 1)]b ￿C;t:
As stressed by Devereux (2004), even though the exchange rate would re-
spond to fundamental shocks, acting as a shock absorber, it will not foster
an e¢ cient allocation.
Thus, a monetary stance geared to implementing the ￿ exible price allo-
cation in response to all e¢ cient shocks cannot be optimal, as is the case
with complete markets. On the contrary, the optimal policy will respond
similarly to preference shocks as it does to markup shocks￿ accommodating
them in relation to the degree of openness of the economy.40
6.4 International borrowing and lending
The analytical results derived for the case of ￿nancial autarky provide an
e⁄ective interpretive key to study economies with trade in some assets. Fig-
ure I.4 showa impulse responses to shocks to preferences under the optimal
policy. The ￿gures contrast, under PCP, the ￿nancial-autarky economy
characterized above with an economy in which households can trade inter-
nationally a noncontingent bond denominated in Home currency.
Figure II.1
Home Preference Shock and Optimal Policy under Alternative
Financial Structures
Consider ￿rst the response to a positive shock to Home preferences for
current consumption. In a ￿rst best allocation, such a shock would tend to
increase both Home and Foreign output in relation to openness, and have
a direct e⁄ect on international prices, causing a Home real appreciation.
There would be no demand imbalance. The extent of ine¢ ciencies in the
incomplete-market economies is apparent from Figure II.1. Whether or not
international borrowing and lending is possible, the optimal policy has to
40Note that, under the relevant parameterization, the terms of trade drop out of the
loss function: monetary authorities trade o⁄ output gap and in￿ ation stabilization only.
Nonetheless, the optimal policy does redress ￿ at least in part ￿ the misalignments in
relative prices. As explained above, under ￿nancial autarky international price misalign-
ments result from the fact that the terms of trade only respond to output di⁄erentials,
according to (62). Since the optimal policy at Home and abroad moves to close domestic
output gaps ￿ the monetary stance has the opposite sign in the two countries ￿ this joint
action tends to contain output di⁄erentials, and hence the suboptimal real depreciation.
68trade o⁄ competing domestic and external goals. As a result, the output
gap is positive in the Home country, negative in the Foreign country. The
excessive di⁄erential in outputs across countries maps into misalignments
in international prices: the real exchange rate and thus the terms of trade
are ine¢ ciently weak. The demand gap is overall negative, pointing to a
negative imbalance ￿ at the current real exchange rate ￿ in relative Home
consumption. This is in turn mirrored by an ine¢ ciently high level of real
net exports. Note that, by pursuing a tighter Home monetary stance, rela-
tive to the stance consistent with the e¢ cient allocation, the Home monetary
authorities react to the misalignment and the negative demand imbalances.
The optimal policy aims at containing the di⁄erences in output gaps and
strengthening the Home real exchange rate, thus reducing the relative de-
mand gap at the cost of some negative GDP in￿ ation (positive in the Foreign
country).
The qualitative responses in the ￿gure are the same across market struc-
tures, particularly concerning the monetary stance. Introducing borrowing
and lending does not change the fundamental transmission channels through
which optimal policy redresses the ine¢ ciencies in the economy. It is worth
stressing that these channels a⁄ect the fundamental valuation of output via
relative price adjustment ￿ rather than involving any systematic attempt
to manipulate the ex post value of nominal bonds via in￿ ation and depreci-
ation, as to make returns contingent on the state of the economy.41
However, the size of the deviations from the ￿rst best allocation is sub-
stantially smaller in the bond economy. This re￿ ects the fact that, under the
adopted parameterization, international trade in bonds allows households to
self insure against temporary shocks, thus limiting the deviations from the
￿rst-best in the incomplete market economy with ￿ exible prices.42 Yet, even
in this economy, the optimal policy can still achieve a welfare-improving al-
location by trading o⁄ some movements in in￿ ation and output gaps for
smaller movements in currency misalignments and demand gaps.
41The empirical role of valuation e⁄ects in the international adjustment has been ana-
lyzed by Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), among others.
The interactions between these e⁄ects and monetary policy, within incomplete market
framework and endogenous portfolio decisions, is an important topic for future research.
42For a discussion of the risk-insurance properties of international trade in bonds with
temporary and permanent shocks see Baxter and Crucini (1995).
696.5 Discussion
In this section of this chapter, we have argued that incomplete asset mar-
kets create new and potentially important policy trade-o⁄s, in line with the
notion that misalignments can and are likely to arise independently of nom-
inal and monetary distortions, and that frictions in ￿nancial markets lead
to cross-country demand imbalances.43 In the economies discussed above,
the optimal policy consists of reacting to shocks to correct consumption and
employment both within and across borders, typically addressing overap-
preciation and underappreciation of exchange rates.
Optimal monetary policy in open-economy models with incomplete mar-
kets is the subject of a small but important strand of the literature. Among
these contributions, we have already mentioned Devereux (2004), who builds
an example of economies under ￿nancial autarky hit by demand shocks in
which, even when the exchange rate is a fundamental shock absorber, it may
in fact be better to prevent exchange rate adjustment altogether.44 The rea-
son is the same as the one discussed above: with incomplete international
￿nancial markets, the ￿ exible-price allocation is ine¢ cient. Under PCP, Be-
nigno (2009) ￿nds large gains accruing from cooperative policies relative to
the ￿ exible price allocation in economies whereby the nonstochastic steady-
state is assumed to be asymmetric because of positive net foreign asset hold-
ings by one country.45 Similar to the analysis in this chapter, the working
paper version of this paper, Benigno (2001), characterizes welfare di⁄erences
between cooperative policies and the ￿ exible price allocation in economies
with incomplete markets but no steady-state asymmetries. Benigno (2001,
2009), however, assumes purchasing power parity, hence abstracts from mis-
alignments which are instead central to more recent contributions.46
Welfare costs from limited international asset trade are discussed by
Devereux and Sutherland (2008), who posit a model in which markets are
e⁄ectively complete under ￿ exible prices and with no random elements in
43See, e.g., Lahiri, Singh, and Vegh (2007) for a model studing optimal exchange rate
regimes with segmented asset markets under ￿ exible prices.
44A long-standing view is that the exchange rate may be driven by non-fundamental,
see, e.g., Jeanne and Rose (2002) and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006).
45For an early contribution on the topic, see Dellas (1988).
46Other contributions have looked at the optimal policy in a small open-economy, in-
complete markets framework ￿ see, e.g., De Paoli (2009b). A related literature focuses
on optimized simple rules. In Kollmann (2002), for instance, exchange rate volatility is
driven by exogenous shocks to the model￿ s uncovered interest parity (UIP) relation: a
policy of complete currency stabilization that eliminates these shocks would be optimal
for very open economies, but not for the kind of relatively less open economies we study.
70monetary policy. In their analysis, strict in￿ ation targeting also closes mis-
alignments and attains the e¢ cient allocation vis-￿-vis technology shocks
￿ in accord with the results in the ￿rst part of the chapter. In Corsetti,
Dedola, and Leduc (2009b), we reconsider the same issue in standard open
macro models with incomplete markets, pointing out that inward-looking
monetary policies like strict in￿ ation targeting may well result in (rather
than correcting) misalignments in exchange rates. We characterize mon-
etary policy trade-o⁄s arising in incomplete-market economies, identifying
conditions under which optimal monetary policy redresses these ine¢ cien-
cies, achieving signi￿cant welfare gains. The size or even the sign of the
gaps in relative demand and international prices shaping policy trade-o⁄s
in open economies can vary signi￿cantly with the values of preference para-
meters such as ￿ and ￿, the degree of openness, the nature and persistence
of shocks, and especially the structure of ￿nancial markets.
7 Conclusions
This chapter has addressed the question of how optimal monetary policy
should be conducted in interdependent open economies, proposing a uni￿ed
analytical framework to systematize the existing literature, and pointing to
new directions of research.
According to received wisdom, the answer to our question is that macro-
economic interdependence is relevant to the optimal monetary conduct only
to the extent that it a⁄ects domestic output gaps and in￿ ation. Therefore,
the optimal policy prescriptions are the same as the ones derived in the base-
line monetary model abstracting from openness and can be readily applied
in terms of the same targeting rules in output gaps and GDP in￿ ation. As
shown in this chapter, however, such answer turns out to be a good guide
to policy making only under two key special conditions ￿ a high respon-
siveness of import prices to the exchange rate, and frictionless international
￿nancial markets supporting the e¢ ciency of the ￿ exible price allocation.
Under general conditions, optimal policy instead does require policy makers
to trade o⁄s domestic and external gaps, i.e., to redress misalignments in
international relative prices and cross-country demand imbalances.
Stressing the empirical evidence questioning a high responsiveness of
import prices to the exchange rate, a large body of literature explores the
policy implications of stickiness in the price of imports in local currency.
In this case, there is an optimal trade o⁄ between output gaps and mis-
alignments in domestic and international relative prices induced by multiple
71nominal distortions. The focus of policymakers naturally shifts from GDP
de￿ ator in￿ ation, to CPI in￿ ation, and onto real exchange rate stabilization,
containing deviations from the law of one price.
Similarly, trade-o⁄s between output gaps and the terms of trade emerge
when policymakers do not internalize international monetary spillovers, and
engage in cross-country strategic interactions. Re￿ ecting traditional models
of competitive devaluation, the modern paradigm emphasizes the incentives
for national policymakers to manipulate the terms of trade to raise national
welfare, that arise in the absence of international policy coordination.
But, in addition to the two cases above extensively discussed in the
literature, a third important source of policy trade-o⁄s with an international
dimension are induced by ￿nancial imperfections. Key lessons for monetary
policy analysis can be learnt from models in which asset markets do not
support the e¢ cient allocation ￿ in line with the notion that misalignments
can occur independently of nominal and monetary distortions, and indeed
can be expected to occur per e⁄ects of large distortions in ￿nancial markets.
Our analysis focuses on standard open-economy models where restric-
tions to cross-border trade in assets result in signi￿cant misallocation of
consumption and employment within countries, associated with interna-
tional demand imbalances and exchange rate misalignments. Although the
exchange rate responds to fundamentals, acting as a ￿shock absorber￿ , cur-
rency misalignments contribute to drive a wedge between the e¢ cient and
the market outcomes, globally and domestically. Optimal monetary policy
thus should target a combination of inward-looking variables such as output
gap and in￿ ation, with currency misalignment and cross-country demand
misallocation, by leaning against the wind of misaligned exchange rates and
international imbalances.
This analysis points to largely unexplored areas of research, focusing on
the design of monetary policy in models with explicit ￿nancial distortions as
a complement or an alternative to what we have done in this chapter. From
an open-economy perspective, the goal is to foster the understanding of the
inherent link between ￿nancial distortions and misalignments, wealth and
demand imbalances, which distort market outcomes both within and across
countries, and thus have potentially important implications for the optimal
design of monetary policies.
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82Table I.1. Benchmark parameter values
Benchmark Model
Preferences and Technology
Risk aversion ￿ = 2
Probability of resetting prices 1 ￿ ￿ = 0:25
Frisch labor supply elasticity (inverse of) ￿ = 1:5
Elasticity of substitution between:
Home and Foreign traded goods ￿ = 1
Home traded goods ￿ = 6
Share of Home Traded goods aH = 0:90
Shocks
Productivity ￿z = 0:95; ￿z = 0:001
Preference ￿￿ = 0:95; ￿￿ = 0:001
Markup ￿￿ = 0:001
83Table I.2. Volatilities Under Optimal Policy (Complete Market
Economies)
With PCP With LCP
Productivity and With Markup Productivity and With Markup
Statistics Preference Shocks Shocks Preference Shocks Shocks
Standard deviation
(in percent)
CPI In￿ ation 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.03
GDP De￿ ator In￿ ation 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04
Output Gap 0.00 0.16 0.14 0.19
Markup 0.00 0.52 0.14 0.53
Standard deviation
(Relative to Output)
Real Exchange Rate 2.71 2.75 2.99 2.59
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-3 For. GDP Inflation
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